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NATURE OF THE CASE 
For a second time, ajury unanimously decided that Appellants (collectively, "S1. AI's") 
breached their fiduciary duties thereby causing Respondents (collectively, "MRIA") significant 
damages. The facts unequivocally demonstrated that S1. AI's usurped MRIA's opportunity to 
partner in Intermountain Medical Imaging ("IMI") and then competed with MRIA's businesses 
while still a partner in MRIA. Indeed, the evidence at both this trial and the first one was: 
(1) that S1. AI's was engaged in an all-out turf war with S1. Luke's; (2) that S1. AI's saw the 
partnership agreement with MRIA as obstructing it from winning that war; and (3) that as a 
result, it made the fateful decision to do whatever it took to win, its contractual and fiduciary 
obligations to MRIA notwithstanding. Tellingly, most of these facts were proven through the 
reluctant testimony of St. AI's own witnesses, especially its former CEO, Sandra Bruce, who 
changed much of her damaging testimony from the first trial only to be impeached in the second 
trial over 35 times. 
Given these facts, S1. AI's litigation strategy on remand unsurprisingly seemed much less 
concerned with winning on the merits and much more with trying to stop or delay the jury from 
making a decision at all--especially in light ofMRIA's ever-weakening financial condition. For 
example,just since the remand, St. AI's filed 32 motions, including 12 dispositive motions,l as 
well as numerous motions in limine. And when it became apparent that the second trial would 
proceed despite these efforts, S1. AI's turned to more aggressive measures-asking the new trial 
judge to recuse himself just a few months before trial on the thinnest of pretexts; moving for a 
1 See, e.g., R., 299-379, 739-754, 940-962, 980-1012, 2209-2338, 2813-2855, 3870-3898. 
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mistrial based on a very minor incident; and even trying create a mistrial itself by violating an 
order which it had specifically asked the court to enter. R., 1224-32; Tr., 917:15-924:15, 2717:6-
2718:7,2778:22-2781:22. While this latter effort was so transparent to merit a strong warning 
from the court, the trial continued and the jury unanimously decided for MRIA. Id. 
St. AI's has now appealed the jury's verdicts, asserting that in spite of the trial court's 
repeated and painstaking efforts to follow the corrections required by this Court in Saint 
Alphonsus Diversified Care v. MRI Associates, 148 Idaho 479,224 P.3d 1068 (2009) (hereinafter 
SADC), both the trial court and the jury still somehow got it wrong. But contrary to St. AI's 
intimations, the record demonstrates the trial court went to great lengths to ensure there was no 
error and that the trial was even-handed. Consequently, most of St. AI's arguments bear little 
relation to what actually happened at trial--or to what this Court held in SADC. 
For example, St. AI's asserts that this Court in SADC "limited" MRIA's "damages in 
important ways." Brief at 1. Yet SADC did not limit damages in any way other than to state that 
MRlA itself could not recover on behalf of the limited partnerships, which was immaterial once 
the limited partnerships were added as parties. St. AI's also erroneously asserts that the trial 
court allowed MRIA to recover $40 million in damages caused by lawful competition after 2005. 
This is flatly wrong: the trial court clearly instructed the jury that it could award damages 
incurred after 2005 only if it found the damages were caused by pre-April 2005 conduct. The 
trial court then found, while sitting as the "13 th juror" when ruling on St. AI's JNOV motion, that 
"there was substantial evidence" upon which the jury could find that St. AI's pre-April 2005 
conduct caused MRIA damages after April 2005. Furthermore, contrary to St. AI's assertion, 
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the trial court carefully considered Pope v. Intermountain Gas, 103 Idaho 217, 233, 646 P.2d 988 
(1982), and correctly determined that MRIA satisfied its requirements. 
St. AI's also erroneously argues that the trial court misconstrued Bushi v. Sage Health 
Care, 146 Idaho 764, 203 P.3d 694 (2009), and thereby allowed the jury to find that its "rightful" 
dissociation was wrongful. The Court, however, never allowed the jury to find that St. AI's 
dissociation was wrongful. Indeed, the transcript reveals that not only did the trial court construe 
Bushi precisely as St. AI's asked it to, but that St. AI's recognized as much on the record. Tr., 
6397:20-6402:25; R., 3242. Similarly, St. AI's feigns outrage that this second verdict is higher 
than before, yet somehow ignores that the simple reason for this was because MRIA's estimates 
of future damages in the 2007 trial turned out to be much less than its actual damages proved 
through 2011 in the second trial. 
But perhaps most telling is St. AI's near-wholesale omission of the relevant standards for 
overturning the decisions it opposes. This strategy is not accidental, since all but a few of its 
issues for review are discretionary, factual, or evidentiary, meaning that most of the trial court 
decisions that St. AI's challenges are protected by a highly deferential "abuse of discretion" 
standard. Moreover, in order to prevail on its arguments, St. AI's has chosen to simply reargue 
its selective version of the facts, in vain hope that this Court will usurp the role of the jury. 
In short, the truth is that the jury's verdict had nothing to do with a confused trial judge, a 
failure to follow SADC, deficient damages theories, or any of St. AI's other illusory claims of 
error. Instead, the overwhelming evidence is that St. AI's continuously and profoundly breached 
its duties as a MRIA partner, a reality which at least two juries and two judges have recognized. 
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The course of proceedings2 in this matter is already well known to this Court. In 2007, a 
jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor ofMRIA against St. AI's. See SADC, 224 P.3d at 
1072-73. It found that St. AI's had violated both its fiduciary and contractual duties to MRIA, 
and awarded MRIA-after remittitur-roughly $36 million. Id. St. AI's thereafter appealed, 
and this Court reversed the verdict and remanded the case for another trial with certain 
instructions for the trial court. See generally id. The new judge, Judge Wetherell, who was 
appointed after St. AI's struck Judge McLaughlin, scrupulously followed those instructions, and 
the case was re-tried over the course of about eight weeks in the fall of 20 11. After the 
corrections required by this Court, the second jury also rendered unanimous verdicts in favor of 
MRIA. R., 3168-80. St. AI's again appealed. 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
Because this case involves commercial transactions, MRIA requests its attorneys' fees 
and costs on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3), IAR 40 and 41, and all other applicable law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As this Court already knows, MRIA was formed in 1985 by a handful of local hospitals, 
including St. AI's, and a group of physicians. SADC, 224 P.3d at 1072-73. Their plan was to 
bring MRI services to Idaho, including: (1) a technical component, which utilized MRI scanning 
2 St. AI's "Course of Proceedings" section runs 9 pages and does not really address how this 
matter came to this Court; rather it serves as a second "Argument" section. Brief, pp. 7-16. 
MRIA's reading ofIAR 35 is that this is an inappropriate use of a "Course of Proceedings" 
section, and therefore it presents its rebuttal in the "Argument" section below. 
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equipment and technicians, and produced the MRI images; and (2) a professional component, 
which primarily involved doctors reading and interpreting the images. Id. MRIA, through its 
subsidiaries known as "Center" and "Mobile," provided the technical component, while 
radiologists at the individual hospitals provided the professional component. Id. 
St. AI's former COO testified that, from its formation, Center was considered one and the 
same as St. AI's radiology department. Tr.,3800:5-3804:5. For years, St. AI's designated a 
group of radiologists known as Gem State Radiology, or "GSR,,,3 as the exclusive readers of 
radiologic images on its campus. SADC, 224 P.3d at 1072-73; Tr., 2036:12-2039:10, 4276:3-
4282:17; see also Ex. 4184 at 1. 
I. The Radiologists, Acting Through GSR, Determine to Establish IMI 
In 1998, GSR announced that it would establish its own imaging center, which would 
become 1M!. SADC, 224 P.3d at 1072-73. Soon after this declaration, GSR, MRIA, and St. AI's 
began negotiations towards forming an alliance in 1M!. Id. It was determined that MRIA would 
negotiate with GSR regarding joint-venturing in the MRI services at IMI and that St. AI's would 
separately negotiate with GSR regarding other radiologic modalities (e.g., x-ray, CT, etc.). Ex. 
4062 at 2; Tr., 209:5-211:14, 638:1-639:23. MRIA was not concerned about St. AI's negotiating 
separately because it knew that St. AI's could not partner with GSR in an imaging center unless 
MRIA provided a waiver of their mutual non-compete agreement-meaning that these "parallel 
negotiations" either had to create what came to be called "one big happy family" among the three 
3 This group has had several names over the years, including "Saint Alphonsus Radiology 
Group," or SARG, "Boise Radiology," "ICR," and the "Rads." 
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entities, or that St. AI's could not participate in 1M!. Tr., 209:5-211 :14,276:4-17, 942:16-943:4; 
Ex. 4023, § 9. Notably, St. AI's agreed at trial that achieving this "one big happy family" was 
the goal of the parallel negotiations and if the negotiations failed, St. AI's could not proceed with 
IMI without creating a material conflict of interest for itself. Tr., 2530:13-25, 1940:21-1943:9. 
The negotiations between MRIA and GSR focused on GSR receiving an interest in 
MRIA in exchange for MRIA receiving an interest in 1M!. Ex. 424 at 1-2. By mid-1999, GSR 
and MRIA had negotiated almost all the relevant terms of such an agreement, and both sides 
considered a deal to be imminent. See, e.g., Ex. 4079 at 2 (~L); Ex. 4077 at 3; Tr., 249: 17-
252:16, 762:11-17, 949:14-950:8. However, the parties became momentarily stuck on a 
comparatively small matter, and so Sandra Bruce, St. AI's CEO, volunteered (or readily agreed) 
to step in and finish negotiations. Tr., 254:9-257: 18, 762: 11-17. Again, while this meant that St. 
AI's was now lead on both sets of negotiations-which could provide opportunity for self-
dealing-no one at MRIA was concerned given the non-compete and the fact that Bruce, as both 
St. AI's leader and as a sitting MRIA board member, owed strict fiduciary duties ofloyalty and 
fidelity to MRIA. Tr., 209:5-211:14, 254:9-257:18, 260:22-263:13; Ex. 4023, § 9. 
II. St. AI's Exclusion of MRIA from the IMI Opportunity 
At trial, however, it was shown that St. AI's never tried or even wanted to make MRIA's 
negotiations with GSR successful. Instead, the evidence was that St. AI's saw shedding itself 
from the MRIA noncompete, which prevented St. AI's from competing with the other MRIA 
hospitals, and opening a new "independent imaging center as a way to take away business from 
St. Luke's." Tr., 1936:8-1937:25; see also Tr., 1317:12-1319:5, 1226:24-1231:21, 1239:4-
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1244:11,1308:23-1311:13,1361:20-1362:12, 2510:22-2511:5,5127:15-5130:9; Exs. 4117 at 2, 
9 (slide 4,18),4239 at 5, 11. The evidence further demonstrated that St. AI's realized that ifit 
took the opportunity to partner with GSR in IMI for itself, and left its MRIA partners out of IMI, 
its profits would be significantly greater. Id St. AI's accordingly adopted partnering with IMI 
and extricating itself from MRIA as a "strategic imperative." Id 
While St. AI's certainly had lawful avenues by which to leave MRIA, all of those options 
were apparently either too slow or too costly for St. AI's. Accordingly, Bruce used the very 
position to which her partners had entrusted her to close a deal on MRIA's behalf to accomplish 
the exact opposite-to cut MRIA out ofIMI altogether. In particular, by late summer 1999, St. 
AI's executives counseled GSR to backburner negotiations with MRIA and complete a separate 
deal with St. AI's first. Tr., 1249:7-1253:18,3346:22-3348:3; Ex. 4101 at 1-2. GSR's CFO, Jeff 
Cliff, testified that completing a deal with St. AI's prior to negotiating further on the MRIA side 
made it very difficult for MRIA to conclude a deal with GSR. Tr., 3346:22-3348:3. 
Then, unbeknownst to MRIA, St. AI's, on its own behalf, made GSR an offer which 
made any deal between MRIA and GSR untenable. In December 1999, St. AI's offered GSR a 
50% ownership in Center (an increase of 30%-40% from previous MRIA offers) ifGSR would 
give St. AI's-and St. AI's alone-a 50% ownership in 1M!. Tr., 2530:13-2536:25,1281:23-
1291 :18, 1304:5-1311 :13. Simple economics meant that GSR now had no reason to negotiate 
further with MRIA: St. AI's was taking for itself the 50% ownership interest in IMI that its 
partner MRIA had been negotiating with GSR for months, and now GSR would get a greater 
ownership interest in Center in return at a much lower cost. Tr., 1304:5-1311:13; Ex. 424 at 1-2. 
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St. AI's CFO agreed on cross-examination that these St. AI's negotiations effectively "killed" 
any hope ofa deal between MRIA and GSR. Tr., 2530:13-2536:25, see also 278:21-281:23. 
By early January 2000, MRIA had learned that negotiations for a deal between it and 
GSR-which GSR had previously described as imminent-were floundering, though it did not 
have any idea that St. AI's was the cause. Tr.,265:23-268:6. Still hopeful that a deal could be 
done, MRIA asked St. AI's to improve MRIA's offer considerably by offering a much larger 
ownership in MRIA than before. Tr., 283:8-286:21; Ex. 4137. St. AI's, however, never passed 
this new offer on, even though it admitted it had a fiduciary duty to do SO.4 In fact, GSR's Dr. 
Seabourn confirmed that not only did GSR never receive the offer, but that he could not recall 
anything St. AI's had ever done to bring MRIA and GSR together. Tr., 5292:11-23, 5463:6-13. 
Having usurped MRIA's opportunity to partner with GSR in IMI, St. AI's knew it could 
not simply withdraw and compete with MRIA, because the MRIA partnership agreement had 
been amended so that even with a lawful withdrawal, St. AI's would still have to wait four more 
years before it could compete. Ex., 4050, § 2.2; Tr., 1855:5-1859:3. Similarly, it knew it could 
not lawfully join IMI while a MRIA partner, because IMI was now MRIA's competitor. Ex. 
4150 at 2; Ex. 4023 at § 9. Thus, the only lawful option left to St. AI's was to buy Center. Yet 
St. AI's never made an offer to purchase Center. Tr., 303:3-23, 851 :7-14, 961 :6-9,2664:13-
4 Tr., 283:8-286:21,970:16-971:3, 1336:16-1338:19,1341:3-1344:15; Ex. 4137. The reasons for 
St. AI's choice not to pass on to GSR the enhanced offer were obvious. Besides imperiling St. 
AI's ongoing attempts at self-dealing, the amount of ownership MRIA was offering would give 
GSR more control at MRIA than St. AI's had itself, a possibility which was certainly at odds 
with St. AI's "strategic imperatives." Tr., 1341 :3-1346:9. 
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2666:9.5 Instead, it secretly partnered with IMI while still a partner in MRIA, in violation of its 
fiduciary and contractual duties.6 
Likely in recognition that its arrangement with IMI was unlawful, at some point St. AI's 
began contending that it was only investing in the "non-MRI side ofIMI." However, as Jeff 
Cliff testified, this distinction was illusory; as a practical matter, there was no such thing as the 
"non-MRI side ofIMI," and even ifthere was, St. AI's ignored that distinction at every turn.7 
III. St. AI's Ensures IMl's Success-at MRIA's Expense 
IMI quickly became a formidable competitor for MRIA, and ironically did so based on 
the support ofMRIA's own partner. Since St. AI's earned significantly more on each scan with 
IMI than it did with MRIA (Tr., 1308:23-1311: 13), it wanted to make sure that IMI would be 
successful in attracting patients, even if the referring physicians were current MRIA clients. As 
such, S1. AI's used its conflicted position as a partner in both MRIA and IMI to siphon business 
away from MRIA and towards 1M!. For example, S1. AI's secretly put several of its highest-
ranking executives on both IMI's management committee and MRIA's board, who then 
disclosed competitively sensitive MRIA information to 1M!. See, e.g., Tr., 325: 18-328: 1; 
1442:18-1447:16, 1489:11-1495:20,2513:5-2517:25. Moreover, while still a MRIA partner, S1. 
AI's quietly contributed several hundreds of thousands of dollars to ensure IMI's success, and 
then used its resources to market IMI to S1. AI's physicians, most of whom had been previously 
5 These facts flatly contradict St. AI's assertion in its Brief at 6 that MRIA decided not to support 
a deal with S1. AI's. There was never a deal to support as S1. AI's never made an offer. 
6 Ex. 4226; Tr., 347:16-348:19 (MRIA first learned of the IMI agreement in litigation). 
7 Tr. 1034:15-1040:4; see also, e.g., 1497:25-1501:1,1941:5-1945:2,2007:19-2010:23,2099:5-
2104:19,2512:18-2514:7,2537:5-2555:24,5994:3-5996:2. 
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referring scans to MRIA.8 Similarly, St. AI's worked with IMI to ensure it had access to St. AI's 
proprietary and then-cutting-edge technology which provided doctors with on-line access to 
images in their offices, but then blocked that same access to its other partnership, MRIA. Tr., 
3264:18-3267:4,3484:12-3486:8, 3495:4-3505:10, 3511:17-3516:2, 3534:14-3536:14, 3543:22-
3552:15. The evidence at trial was that St. AI's feet-dragging as to access to its technology may 
have cost MRIA the most business of any of St. AI's bad acts, since for over three years referring 
doctors were getting much more convenient delivery of scans and reports from IMI, and did not 
know why they could not get the same services from MRIA. Id. MRIA did not know either. 
St. AI's also made plans to expand IMI into Meridian, and then misled MRIA to stall it 
from pursuing that valuable opportunity as wel1.9 Further, St. AI's designated IMI its "outpatient 
facility" while it was still partners with MRIA, but never told MRIA about the designation. See, 
e.g., Tr., 1025:14-1027:22,2066:23-2072:8,2515:23-2517:25; Ex. 4209 at 1. Indeed, these 
actions were consistent with St. AI's obstruction of the future growth ofMRIA by using its 
position in MRIA to keep MRIA from advancing into multiple lucrative opportunities-acts 
which St. AI's attributed at the time to generic "business concerns" but which were in reality 
aimed at helping IMI succeed while crippling MRIA. Tr., 340:3-347:1, 1485:12-1489:7, 
2073:20-2075:23; Exs. 4239 at 12-13,4221 at 2-4. 
Meanwhile, knowing that St. AI's wanted patients to go to IMI instead, St. AI's co-
8 See, e.g., Exs. 4226 at § 4.1 (and its Ex. 4.1), 4248 at 1,4314,4253; Tr., 1479:11-1482:24, 
6011 :4-6016: 11. 
9 See, e.g., Tr., 313:19-318:13,1505:1-1514:11,2111:13-2114:2, 3912:2-3913:18; Exs. 4210 at 
1,4211 at 1,4215 at 3. 
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conspirator GSRIO began taking clients from MRIA. GSR was uniquely positioned to do so as it 
provided radiology services to both Center and IMI, and thus, was the point of contact with the 
customers of both facilities. In some cases, GSR physically walked patients out ofMRIA and 
took them to 1M!. Ex. 348; Tr., 3728: 16-3730:14,4012:13-4014:23. It also essentially 
eliminated weekend and night service at MRIA while, at the same time, St. AI's and GSR 
expanded IMI's weekend and night service. Ex. 4277; Tr., 3746:15-3757:18, 3942:20-3946:16, 
3957:23-3969:11,5502:7-5510:15. This caused MRIA to lose significant business, since 
referring doctors got more convenient after-hours service from IMI, but could not get the same 
2417 service from MRIA. II And even when they were at MRIA, these radiologists provided 
worse service and caused MRIA to produce poorer quality images than those produced by 1M!. 
See, e.g., Tr., 3727:3-3728:15, 3745:22-3752:4, 3969:12-3970:24, 5821:13-5827:12. They also 
started baseless rumors that MRIA was going to shut down and that MRIA' s magnets were 
subpar, both of which were injurious to MRIA's business. 12 The evidence at trial was that St. 
AI's was specifically informed about all this behavior and was in a position to stop it, but that it 
chose to sit on its hands while MRIA's businesses deteriorated. 13 
IO The jury found that St. AI's and GSR were co-conspirators, a verdict that St. AI's has not 
appealed. R.,3171. 
I See Tr., 3942:20-3946:16, 290:1-294:7, 335:10-336:13, 2070:23-2072:12, 2640:16-2649:16, 
3754:16-3757:18,3937:22-3939:22, 4290:21-4292:13, 5502:7-5510:15; Exs. 4292 at 1-6,4277. 
12 See, e.g., Tr., 366:22-371:9,391 :9-402:2,412:23-417:7,2943:20-2946:9,3758:22-3760:17, 
3948:10-3952:4,3985:20-3990:19, 4018:20-4020:24, 4284:13-4288:21; Exs. 4280 at 2,4302, 
4309 at 2,4498 at 2-3. 
I3 See, e.g., Tr., 290:1-298:22, 335:10-336:13, 391:9-402:2, 412:23-416:3, 2943:20-2946:9, 
3746:15-3757:18,3957:23-3970:24, 3985:20-3990:19, 4012:13-4014:23, 4290:21-4292:13; Exs. 
496 at 1-2,4137 at 2,4280,4292,4498. 
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IV. St. AI's Course of Conduct Severely Damaged MRIA 
The result of these and many more wrongful acts was exactly what St. AI's intended: 
MRIA lost substantial business while IMI's revenues increased reciprocally. See, e.g., Ex. 
5011A. Based on the data for doctors who had previously used Center, MRIA's expert witness 
tracked the migration of referrals and could "tell how many scans they did at each of the 
locations and basically observe what the migration of scans and referrals had been." Tr., 
4509:18-4510:20; Ex. 5035. He reported that in 2001, for example, Center performed 4,844 
scans for St. AI's-affiliated doctors, but by 2005 the number had dropped to 2,083-a decrease 
of over half ofMRIA's business from those doctors in just four years. Ex. 5035 at 3. By 2006, 
the scans dropped to 628 and by 2009, MRIA only performed 26 scans for that group of doctors. 
Id. During the same period, IMI's scans ordered by the same group jumped from 2,869 in 2001 
to 4,707 in 2004 and 6,840 in 2007. Id. 
Indeed, St. AI's plan worked so well that at some point, it confirmed internally that the 
cheapest option for it was to wait for MRIA to lose most of its business, and then either buy it at 
a severely discounted price (given that its value would then be decreased) or simply dissociate. 
Tr., 1430:25-1435:8,2916:13-2917:14,4418:3-8. It ultimately chose the latter course, even 
though St. AI's CEO admitted that such a tactic would be unethical. Tr., 1430:25-1435:8. 
Thus, due to St. AI's acts, by the time the non-compete expired in 2005, MRIA had 
already lost its opportunity to partner with GSR in IMI, had lost most of its business on St. AI's 
campus, and had lost the opportunity to build businesses in Meridian and beyond. Moreover, it 
had lost any ability to seriously compete with IMI, who by 2005-2006 had taken most of the 
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business MRIA once had. Tr., 4028:15-4030:6, 4032:25-4033:8; Exs. 5011A, 5035. Indeed, the 
evidence shows that MRIA has not had any profits to distribute since 2005 and that Center had 
lost virtually in its entire pre-IMI value and is now worth only $150,000 to $200,000. Tr., 431 :5-
432:20. In the meantime, S1. AI's has been enjoying substantial profits from its usurped 
partnership with GSR in 1M!. Ex. 5082. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MRIA PROVED ITS DAMAGES CASE 
A. Center Overwhelmingly Proved Causation and the Amount of Its Damages 
At the outset, it should be noted that S1. AI's arguments as to causation and damages are 
that MRIA's proofwas deficient. This Court, however, has held on numerous occasions that it 
"must affirm the jury verdict if it is supported by substantial and competent evidence." See, e.g., 
Lakeland True Value Hardware v. Hartford Fire Ins., 153 Idaho 716, 726, 291 P.3d 399 (2012). 
By substantial, it is not meant that the evidence need be uncontradicted. All that is 
required is that the evidence be of sufficient quantity and probative value that 
reasonable minds could conclude that the verdict of the jury was proper. It is not 
necessary that the evidence be of such quantity or quality that reasonable minds 
must conclude, only that they could conclude. 
Inland Group 01 Cos. v. Provo Wash. Ins., 133 Idaho 249,253-54,985 P.2d 674 (1999). The 
credibility of witnesses and weight to be given their testimony are matters exclusively within the 
province of the jury. Goodwin V. Wulfenstein, 107 Idaho 492, 495-96, 690 P.2d 947 (C1. App. 
1984). In other words, unless the jury's findings as to causation and damages are "clearly 
erroneous," they must be affirmed. Spanbauer V. JR. Simplot Co., 107 Idaho 42, 44, 685 P.2d 
271 (1984). St. AI's, however, mistakenly argues both as to damages and throughout its Brief 
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that because it was able to procure some contradictory evidence, the jury's verdict should be 
overturned. In any event, despite St. AI's conclusory arguments to the contrary, MRIA 
introduced more than sufficient evidence for reasonable minds to conclude that St. AI's caused 
$52 million in damages to MRIA and its businesses, Center and Mobile, as described below. 
St. AI's arguments also fail because they conflate proof of causation with proof of the 
amount of damages, and then apply the wrong standard for proving causation. Specifically, in 
order to prove causation and damages, MRIA needed to prove only that it was damaged, that St. 
AI's was a substantial factor in proximately causing the damage, and the amount of damages. At 
trial, MRIA easily met its burden as to each of those elements. 
1. Center Proved the Fact of Damage/Causation 
Nowhere in St. AI's Brief does it dispute that MRIA was damaged or that it did not lose 
substantial business to St. AI's other partnership, 1M!. Indeed, the undisputed evidence at trial 
was that referring physicians shifted their referrals from MRIA's business, Center, to IMI while 
St. AI's was a partner in both entities as there was a strongly correlated loss of scans by Center 
and increase in scans at 1M!. See, e.g., Ex. 5011A. The data presented to the jury demonstrated 
unequivocally that the referring physicians who had historically referred patients to Center 
switched to IMI during the relevant time period. Tr., 4506:20-4510:20, 4640:18-4641:14; Exs. 
5011A, 5035, 4417 A. Thus, MRIA's expert testified "the overall conclusion that there was a 
massive migration of referrals from MRIA to IMI is borne out by the data in the aggregate." Tr., 
4640: 18-4641: 14. From such evidence, the jury could readily infer that revenues had been 
diverted from Center to 1M!. See also Exs. 5083, 5035. 
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Additionally, the jury was read testimony from St. AI's own expert from the first trial, 
Manfred Steiner, confirming that IMI took scans from Center while St. AI's was a partner in 
MRIA. He testified that of the 3,000 scans performed by IMI in 2000, 68% of those came from 
Center. Tr., 6251: 11-6253: 11.14 And this is just the tip of the iceberg; substantial testimony and 
documents introduced at trial demonstrated that Center lost business because of the conduct of 
St. AI's and its co-conspirators. See, e.g., Tr., 3540:11-3544:23, 3525:10-3527:20, 3961:11-
3963:1,3969:12-3971:21,3973:3-3976:20, 3983:6-3985:5, 3986:6-3989:14,4013:3-4014:22, 
4028:19-4030:6,5821:13-5830:5; Exs. 348,496 at 2-3,4010,4292. Put more simply, there is 
substantial evidence that Center was in fact damaged. 15 
a. St. AI's Argument Applies the Wrong Causation Test 
Despite the undisputed fact that St. AI's was a partner in IMI while still a partner in 
MRIA, and despite the fact that it is undisputed that Center lost substantial business to IMI 
during that time, St. AI's takes the indefensible position that there was not sufficient evidence 
from which the jury could find that it was the cause of Center's damage. Its confusion is the 
result of its misunderstanding of what is necessary to prove causation. 
Causation is a question of fact for the jury. Walker v. American Cyanamid, 130 Idaho 
824,831,948 P.2d 1123 (1997). A proximate cause is one that, "in natural or probable 
14 St. AI's expert in the second trial had no real explanation whatsoever for Mr. Steiner's 
testimony, which directly contradicted his own, but instead merely stated, "I don't really care 
what Mr. Steiner said." Tr., 6257:7-23. 
15 The jury could also properly draw reasonable inferences as to the fact of damage from the 
intentional nature of St. AI's conduct. Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 143 Idaho 733, 740, 
152 P.3d 604 (2007). 
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sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage." IDJI 2.30.2. Idaho recognizes two 
mutually exclusive tests for proximate cause: the "but for" test and the "substantial factor" test. 
Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 287-88,127 P.3d 187 (2005). The '''but for' test may be 
employed when there is a single possible cause, but when there are multiple possible causes ... a 
'substantial factor' instruction must be given instead." Id 
While St. AI's does not dispute that Center lost business to IMI, its argument that MRIA 
needed to prove that St. AI's solely caused the entire loss found by the jury is an application of 
the "but for" test, and at that is a misapplication of it. Brief at 20. That test, however, is 
inapplicable here because St. AI's itself contended throughout the case-and presented evidence 
at trial-that there was more than one cause of Center's damages. R., 313-314 n.6; Tr., 4627:6-
10,6276:23-6282:1,6786:19-23. Even in its current brief, St. AI's focuses on MRIA's firing of 
the radiologists as an alternative or additional cause of the losses. Brief at 23. Given these other 
possible causes, the "substantial factor" test was the correct test. Newberry, 142 Idaho at 287-88. 
As such, the trial court instructed the jury according to that test, and critically, St. AI's did not 
object. R., 3084, 3097, 3224; see Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 433, 95 
P.3d 34 (2004) ("one may not. .. complain of errors one has acquiesced in or invited."). 
St. AI's flawed "but for" argument results from its misapplication of Pope. Pope is an 
antitrust case and the precedents on which it relied were all federal antitrust cases. 103 Idaho at 
233-34. This distinction is important, since unlike a common law case like the one at hand, the 
standard in an antitrust case is "but for." See, Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, 801 F.2d 38, 41 (2d 
Cir. 1986) ("the injuries alleged would not have occurred but for the ... antitrust violation") 
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(emphasis added). This "but for" test is applicable in antitrust cases because of the very nature 
of such suits: as observed in Pope, "antitrust laws do not require the courts to protect [] 
businesses from the loss of profits due to continued competition, but only against the loss of 
profits from practices forbidden by the antitrust laws." Pope, 103 Idaho at 233-34. 
In contrast, in this case, the losses were due to competition-competition that would 
never have occurred if St. AI's was obeying its fiduciary and contractual duties to MRIA. Again, 
St. AI's unlawfully created the competitor in breach of its fiduciary duties and then steered 
MRIA's patients to it. In such a case, unlike antitrust, the damages are caused Qy competition. 
Vancil v. Anderson, 71 Idaho 95,105,227 P.2d 74 (1951); Toddv. Sullivan Constr., 146 Idaho 
118, 122, 191 P.3d 196 (2008).16 And of course a defendant accused of such misconduct is 
permitted to defend by showing alternative causes for any loss of profits. That was exactly how 
St. AI's defended here-making the "substantial factor" test the only applicable test. 
b. There Was Substantial Evidence that St. AI's Conduct Was a 
Substantial, Direct Factor in Causing Center's Loss 
St. AI's attempts to evade causation by distinguishing between itself and 1M!. Brief at 
21-23. But this effort is unavailing given that IMI is 50% owned and controlled by St. AI's. Ex. 
4226 at 16,23-24,42; Tr., 4501: 13-4502:3. Moreover, the jury found that St. AI's conspired 
16 At the risk of stating the obvious, this case is different from an antitrust case, because in the 
latter, a plaintiff must show why it is losing customers, since the case will tum on whether the 
loss comes from an antitrust injury or from competition. Conversely, in a breach of a non-
compete case, a plaintiff need not show why it is losing customers to a competitor, but only that 
it is losing customers to the competitor. Vancil, 71 Idaho at 105. In other words, in an antitrust 
case, it is the competition which is lawful whereas in a noncompete it is the competition that is 
unlawful. Consequently, the "but for" test is inapplicable in this case. 
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with GSR to form IMI to compete against MRIA's businesses-a finding that St. AI's has not 
appealed. R.,3171. Thus, regardless of whether it was St. AI's conduct itself that caused 
MRIA's damages or the conduct ofGSR, St. AI's is liable because GSR is its co-conspirator. 
Argonaut Ins. v. White, 86 Idaho 374,379,386 P.2d 964 (1963). 
Moreover, St. AI's contention that there is insufficient evidence to support causation is 
simply wrong. The evidence demonstrates that St. AI's engaged in conduct intentionally 
designed to take business from MRIA and transfer it to St. AI's new partnership, 1M!. Indeed, 
the evidence leaves but one question: prior to its dissociation from MRIA in April 2005, what 
more could St. AI's have done to shift business from MRIA to IMI and to violate the non-
competition clause in the MRIA Partnership Agreement? Again, St. AI's created the competitor 
by sabotaging, rather than promoting, MRIA's opportunity to partner with GSR and create "one 
big happy family" and then took for itself the opportunity to partner with GSR in 1M!. See, e.g., 
Tr., 2530:13-2536:25,1249:7-1253:18, 1281:23-1291:18, 1304:5-1311:13, 1319:6-1320:17, 
1334:14-1341:24,3346:22-3348:3; Exs. 4101 at 1-2,4199 at 1-2,4226. The evidence also 
shows that IMI would likely never have been the competitor it became without St. AI's support 
and assistance. Exs. 545 at VI(B), 4074 at III(A). Indeed, IMI's financing was contingent on St. 
AI's joining IMI-six years before St. AI's ceased being a partner in MRIA. Id. Moreover, St. 
AI's: (1) provided IMI with at least $546,146 in working capital (Tr., 2107:1-4); (2) made a 
$780,000 investment in IMI's information technology (Ex. 4231 at 3); (3) provided IMI with 
knowledgeable staff (Tr., 1489:11-1496:2,2104:3-2106:25, 4441:12-4443:22,5996:8-6000:10); 
(4) made IMI its outpatient facility (Tr., 1025:14-1027:22,2066:23-2072:8,2515:23-2517:25; 
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Ex. 4209 at 1); (5) directed its staff to refer patients solely to IMI (Tr., 2979:21-2984:15; Ex. 
4377); and (6) provided IMI connection to St. AI's digital radiology system, while secretly 
blocking that same access to MRIA (Tr., 3264:18-3267:4, 3484:12-3486:8, 3495:4-3505:10, 
3511:17-3516:2,3534:14-3536:14,3543:22-3552:15; Ex. 4226 at 72). 
Then, while still a partner in MRIA, St. AI's marketed IMI directly to MRIA's customer 
base, the referring physicians. Tr., 1479:11-1480:24,3551:16-3553:8,3558:22-3560:21; Ex. 
4248 at 1. Additionally, St. AI's provided assistance in the management, planning, and founding 
of 1M I Meridian (aka "IMI West"), while simultaneously thwarting MRIA's efforts to establish 
facilities in Meridian and Eagle. Tr., 313:19-318:13,1503:18-1514:11,2111:13-2114:2,3912:2-
3913:18; Exs. 4210 at 1,4211 at 1,4215 at 3. St. AI's also refused to support the growth of 
MRIA by voting against the expansion of Mobile (Tr., 1485:12-1489:7,2073:20-2075:23; 
3916:7-3919:5; Ex. 4221 at 2-4); St. AI's condoned GSR's reduction in effort, services hours, 
and technician support at Center while at the same time participating in the decision to increase 
IMI's hours of operation (Ex. 4277; Tr., 290:1-294:7, 335:10-336:13, 2070:23-2072:12, 
2640:16-2649:16,2944:4-2948:15, 3754:16-3757:18, 3937:22-3939:22, 3942:20-3946:16, 
3957:23-3969:11,4290:21-4292:13,5502:7-5510:15); St. AI's condoned GSR's disparagement 
of Center (Tr., 391:9-402:2, 3985:20-3990:19; Exs. 4302, 4498 at 2-3); St. AI's assisted in 
spreading rumors that Center was closing and that Center's magnets were of poor quality (Tr., 
366:22-371 :9,391 :9-402:2,412:23-417:7,2943:20-2946:9,3758:22-3760: 17,3948: 10-3952:4, 
3985:20-3990:19,4018:20-4020:24,4284:13-4288:21; Exs. 4280 at 2,4302,4309 at 2,4498 at 
2-3); and St. AI's falsely stated that Center's images were not available digitally, even after they 
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finally became accessible, which was very important to referring physicians 17 (Tr., 362:9-363:11, 
4028:15-4030:6,5510:17-5515:15; Ex. 4533).18 
The only reasonable inference from this evidence is that the intended, natural, and 
probable consequence of the conduct proven was the loss of scan volume at Center and the gain 
of that business by IMI-or so the jury could and did reasonably find. 19 Indeed, the business 
performance of the two entities after 1999 and for several years thereafter allowed the jury to 
find the necessary causal connection between St. AI's conduct and MRIA's losses. In particular, 
Ex. 5035 demonstrated that by 2005, most St. AI's-affiliated physicians had substantially 
migrated their business to IMI and that by the end of 2006 virtually all such business had gone to 
IMI. Accordingly, the evidence was more than sufficient for the jury to find that St. AI's 
17 As Center's CEO testified regarding this misstatement, "[o]ur business was on a steep decline 
already, and this kind of put the nail in the coffin. It changed referrals patterns very quickly." 
Tr.,4028:15-4060:6. 
18 In that regard, even the referring physicians who testified on St. AI's behalf admitted that their 
referral patterns changed from Center to IMI because of the above conduct. For example, Dr. 
Anderson, a member of St. AI's staff, testified that he sent his weekend patients to IMI and not 
Center, which is not surprising since, as set forth above, GSR and St. AI's curtailed weekend 
hours at Center so that they could expand them at 1M!. Tr.,5815:3-17. Dr. Anderson further 
testified that he would get "wet reads" from GSR for IMI patients but does not recall getting 
"wet reads" from GSR for Center patients. Tr.,5817:1-21. He also testified that one of the main 
reasons he switched to IMI was because GSR was not updating the "protocols" of the images for 
scans ordered through Center whereas they were updated if the scan was ordered through IMI. 
Tr., 5821:18-5830:5; see also Tr., 3727:3-3730:11; Ex. 4309 at 2. Similarly, Dr. Rivers, a St. 
AI's-employed physician, testified that St. AI's gave her a laptop on which she could view 
images and reports that she used extensively (this laptop was marketed by St. AI's for IMI 
images (Tr., 3540:11-25; Ex. 4233)). It was a great convenience to her because she could get 
immediate results. Tr., 5607:9-5608:22. She further testified that St. AI's "would prefer that we 
keep all of the scans in house." Tr.,5610:3-21. Thus, even the referring physicians called by St. 
AI's provided testimony supporting the conclusion that St. AI's caused Center's losses. 
19 In fact, even St. AI's expert testified that these acts would have a tendency to cause MRIA to 
lose business. Tr., 6266:15-6269:15. 
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misconduct was a substantial factor in causing the losses suffered by the MRIA entities. St. AI's 
was not able to persuade the jury through contrary evidence of other possible causes that its 
conduct was not a substantial factor. 
i. MRIA Was Not Required to Show that Center's Losses 
Were Caused Entirely by St. AI's Conduct 
St. AI's next asserts that MRIA's proof failed because "no witness offered any support 
for ascribing Center's losses entirely to the Hospital's conduct." Brief at 23 (emphasis added). 
But again, MRIA did not need to prove that St. AI's was the sole cause; MRIA's burden was to 
prove only that St. AI's was a substantial factor in bringing about the loss. Newberry, 142 Idaho 
at 288; see also Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912, 919, 684 P.2d 314 (1984) ("The law does not 
require rigid certainty. Rather, it requires, as we have stated, that the evidence be sufficient to 
support a reasonable inference of causation and to allow a jury reasonably to treat that inference 
as more probable than an inference connecting the loss to other causes unrelated to the 
defendant's conduct. ") And as described above, MRIA introduced evidence showing that actions 
by St. AI's and its co-conspirator, GSR, directly caused Center to lose business. 
ii. St. AI's Argument Regarding the Firing of the Radiologists 
is Not Supported by the Facts 
St. AI's argues that, despite the jury's findings, a more likely cause ofMRIA's demise 
revolved around the reputation of GSR and its eventual firing by MRIA. Brief at 23. As an 
initial matter, this argument is factually unsupportable given the undisputed fact that significant 
numbers of scans were being lost while the same radiologists were reading for both IMI and 
Center, long before GSR was fired in January 2005. Exs. 5011A, 4353. Additionally, the 
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argument ignores that MRIA was forced to fire the radiologists because St. AI's refused to stop 
GSR's acts (described above), such as disparaging MRIA's business, providing poor service, 
referring clients to their own clinic, etc. Tr., 429:7-431 :4. And again, any act of the radiologists 
that caused a migration of scans to IMI is imputed to St. AI's as a matter of conspiracy law. 
But far more fundamentally, the real problem with St. AI's argument is that this was 
again a factual issue for the jury to decide, and this Court has stated that it is loath to disturb such 
findings. See, e.g., Boel v. Stewart Title Guar., 137 Idaho 9, 12,43 P.3d 768 (2002). The jury 
was presented with St. AI's evidence in this regard, and found, notwithstanding the radiologists' 
reputation, that St. AI's was a substantial factor in bringing about MRIA's losses. This is enough, 
since Idaho law does not require MRIA to disprove all other causes in order to prove damages. 
Griffith, 143 Idaho at 740-41; Thomas Helic. v. San Tan Ranches, 102 Idaho 567, 570-71, 633 
P.2d 1145 (1981); Adams v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining, 12 Idaho 637, 643, 89 P. 624 (1906) 
("the jury would be justified in returning a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, although it be possible 
that the injury may have resulted from some other cause") (emphasis added). 
Moreover, St. AI's argument demonstrates why it was so problematic for St. AI's to 
create in the first place a powerful competitor by usurping MRIA's opportunity to join with the 
radiologists: MRIA would never have had to worry about these other possible threats to its 
business if St. AI's had not breached its duties, and the applicable law protects MRIA from 
precisely that threat. For example, in Clark v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins., 592 So. 2d 564,568 (Ala. 
1992), a noncompete case, a party argued that the damage evidence was insufficient because it 
"did not take into account such factors as a customer's loyalty to his agent, Clark's good 
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relationship with his customers, and the fact that Clark's replacement did not have as good a 
relationship with the customers .... " Id. The court disagreed, noting "these are the very things 
that the noncompetition agreement protects Liberty National from and are not factors by which 
Clark is entitled to have the trier of fact decrease the amount of damages." Id. (emphasis added). 
iii. St. AI's Consultant Confirmed that St. AI's Caused the 
Damages 
Finally, contrary to St. AI's assertion that causation was not shown (Brief at 23), even St. 
AI's own consultant, Grant Chamberlain, attributed Center's losses entirely to St. AI's. Tr., 
5084:20-5098:19; Ex. 5012B. Chamberlain testified that even assuming the existence of 
competitors such as IMI and new entrants into the market, he had projected that Center's income 
would grow steadily from 2001 to the present. Id. The undisputed fact is that Center's income 
did not continue to grow, but instead started dropping steadily so that by the time St. AI's 
withdrew, its income was cut almost in half. Ex. 50 11A; R., 1671. Since Chamberlain-who St. 
AI's itself called at trial-accounted for competition from IMI and others, the logical inference is 
that it was the bad acts of St. AI's that caused the damages, or so the jury could reasonably find. 
2. Center Proved Amount of Damages with Reasonable Certainty 
It was MRIA's burden at trial to prove the amount of its damages with "with whatever 
definiteness and accuracy the facts permit, but no more." Griffith, 143 Idaho at 741. Hence, 
damages need not be proved with "absolute assurance" or "mathematical exactitude." Id. at 740. 
Thus, a "claim for damages is thrown out only where it is overly speculative." Gillingham 
Const. v. Newby-Wiggins Const., 142 Idaho 15,26, 121 P.3d 946 (2005) (emphasis added). 
Once a plaintiff has proven that a defendant proximately caused some legally cognizable 
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damage, i.e., the fact of damage, "[t]he wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty [in the 
proof of the amount of damages] which [its] own wrong has created." Griffith, 143 Idaho at 747. 
Therefore, "the mere fact that it is difficult to arrive at an exact amount of damages, where it is 
shown that damages resulted, does not mean that damages may not be awarded" as it is 
ultimately "for the trier-of-fact to fix the amount. In fixing that amount, it is for the trier of fact 
to determine the credibility of the witnesses, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and to draw 
reasonable inferences therefrom." Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 774, 118 P.3d 99 (2005). 
Although not articulated by St. AI's, its attack on the damage proof is essentially an 
attack on methodology. Yet all a plaintiff must show is "'a reasonable basis' or 'a rational 
standard' lost profits calculation. [A p]laintiffneed not do these figures the only wayan 
appellate court might imagine. As long as the approach is rational and the trier of fact is given a 
basis upon which to assess the evidence, the courts have tended to sustain an award of damages 
for lost profits." 1 Robert L. Dunn, Recovery of Damages for Lost Profits § 5.5 at 424 (6th 
ed.2005). Similarly, the admissibility of expert testimony is a matter committed to the discretion 
of the trial court and this Court has held that it will not overturn such ruling absent an abuse of 
that discretion. Swallow v. Emergency Med of Idaho P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 592, 67 P.3d 68 
(2003). Accordingly, admissibility depends on the validity of the expert's reasoning and 
methodology, rather than his or her ultimate conclusion. Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 
Idaho 834, 838, 153 P.3d 1180 (2007). So long as the principles and methodology behind a 
theory are valid and reliable, the theory need not be generally agreed upon or accepted. Id 
In this case, St. AI's attacks the methodology ofMRIA's damage experts by erroneously 
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arguing that the only way to prove lost profits in a noncompete case is for a plaintiff to show 
why each transaction that was allegedly misappropriated went to the defendant's business. In 
essence, St. AI's argues that the only acceptable method would be to ask each customer 
(referring physician on each of thousands of scans performed annually), for each transaction (in 
the context of this case, each transaction represents a scan performed by the imaging center as it 
is the scans that generate revenue), why she chose IMI over Center. Brief at 19. But by making 
this argument, St. AI's is, yet again, applying the "but for" test rather than the substantial factor 
test. Moreover, St. AI's tacit position that all of the referring doctors needed to be interviewed 
simply is not required under law of Idaho or any other jurisdiction. As set forth above, all the 
law requires is that the methodology used be rational. 
a. St. AI's Argument Misapplies Pope 
St. AI's mistakenly relies again on Pope for its argument that MRIA was required to 
show why each transaction went from MRIA to IMI. Yet there is nothing in Pope or any other 
authority cited by St. AI's supporting the notion that MRIA was required to prove why each 
individual referring physician switched from MRIA to IMI and why each physician did so as to 
each scan ordered. Idaho law simply does not require a plaintiff-victimized by pervasive 
breaches of fiduciary duties and of a non-compete covenant-to make such impossibly 
burdensome proof as to each of thousands of transactions in each of several years during the 
damages period. Vancil, 71 Idaho at 105; see also Refrigeration Indus. v. Nemmers, 880 S.W.2d 
912,920-21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that it is enough in a breach of a noncompete case to 
show that customers were lost to a competitor). To illustrate the point, if two partners with a 
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non-compete own a convenience store, and one, while still a partner, opens a competing store, 
the partnership does not need to show why it lost each purchase of coffee and donuts to the 
competing store; it need only show that it lost transactions and provide an estimate, almost 
certainly in an aggregate measure, of the losses "with as much definiteness and accuracy as the 
facts permit," with the risk of any uncertainty falling upon the wrongdoer. See id.; see also 
Griffith, 143 Idaho at 741; Prairie Eye etr., Ltd. v. Butler, 768 N.E.2d 414, 422-23 (Ill. Ct. App. 
2002); 1 Robert L. Dunn, Recovery a/Damages/or Lost Profits § 5.1 at 414 (6th ed.2005) 
("[The fact that any proffered calculation is likely to be inexact at best and an estimate within a 
range of probability at worst has not deterred courts from granting relief.") 
Indeed, St. AI's argument was directly rejected in Prairie Eye etr., a case strikingly 
similar to this one. In Prairie Eye etr., the defendant, Butler, was an ophthalmologist who 
worked for the plaintiff Prairie Eye Center but then left to join a competing clinic, Sangamon, in 
violation of a noncompete agreement. 768 N .E.2d at 416-17. Butler attacked the plaintiff s lost 
profit calculation, arguing, like St. AI's does here, that the damages were inherently speculative 
because there was insufficient evidence to support the plaintiff s assumption that 80% of the 
patients it lost were due to Butler's illegal competition: 
Butler argues Wade's [Plaintiffs expert] assertion Prairie would have retained 
80% of its patients is not based on sufficient evidence because his testimony '" 
did not have any statistical support. He points to evidence from several 
ophthalmologists, testifYing for both Prairie and for Butler that glaucoma patients, 
Butler's specialty, were more loyal than the average ophthalmology patient and 
would tend to follow their physician if he were to relocate to a new office within a 
50-mile radius of his previous location. Butler also contends Wade based his 
estimate on a well-managed transition where the leaving physician would not 
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encourage patients to leave but would actively encourage patients to stay, such as 
in the case of retirement. 
Id. at 422-23. The court, however, rejected this argument stating "[b]ecause Butler actively 
violated the restrictive covenant, there is no way of knowing precisely how many patients Prairie 
would have retained. Hence, Butler has created some of the speculation of which he now 
complains regarding the percentage of patients Prairie would have retained after his departure." 
Butler also tried to insulate his conduct by saying his practice was outside the restricted 
area of the noncompete agreement even ifhis new business partner, Sangamon, was in the 
restricted area. Id. at 423. This is similar to St. AI's attempt to insulate itself from liability by 
arguing it is not liable for scans that went to 1M!. The court also rejected this argument stating 
"the evidence showed Butler would not have been able to establish his offices outside of the 
restricted area so quickly without the help of Sangamon" and that "Sangamon's location within 
the restricted area meant Butler could not affiliate himself with Sangamon under the covenant." 
Id. Consequently, the court held "the evidence presented by [plaintiff] oflost profits, while not 
mathematically conclusive, was sufficient to provide a reasonable basis for an award of damages 
for lost profits." Id. Unlike what St. AI's suggests is required, the court did not require the 
plaintiff to interview each patient and find out why the patient changed to the competing center. 
Thus, it was not necessary to interview each and every referring physician to determine 
why the physician sent each scan to 1M!. Instead it is permissible to estimate the amount of loss 
by Center based on the available data, which is what MRIA did in this case. In fact, the 
methodology employed by MRIA is more rigorous than that employed by plaintiff in Prairie Eye 
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etr. of estimating a percentage based solely on experience in the industry. 
b. MRIA's Damage Proof Satisfies Pope 
MRIA's proof satisfies the standards articulated in Pope. In Pope this Court found that: 
There was no justification in the present case for the trial court's determination 
that the gross revenues of the defendants ... provide a reasonable foundation for 
calculating the lost profits of plaintiffs. Such a method of figuring damages 
assumes, without any support in the record, that [defendants '] operation would 
not have won any portion of the insulation market absent antitrust violations. 
Furthermore, it assumes that the plaintiffs had the capacity to assimilate all of the 
business which [defendants] performed, and that plaintiffs would have won that 
business over other insulators who chose not to participate in this action. There is 
simply no evidence in the record to demonstrate a relationship between 
[defendants'] sales figures and plaintiffs' damages so as to support a conclusion 
that HomeGuard's income was the equivalent of plaintiffs' lost profits. 
The record reflects [that] none of the plaintiffs so much as made an estimate, 
reasoned or unreasoned, as to how much money they lost due to the alleged 
antitrust violations by the defendant. 
103 Idaho at 234. MRIA's proofhere makes none of the speculative assumptions made by Judge 
Ward in Pope. Id. at 222-23. Instead, MRIA's proof takes into account other competitors and 
the possibility that IMI would have obtained some portion of the market absent St. AI's conduct. 
MRIA called two experts, Bruce Budge (historical damages) and Charles Wilhoite (future 
damages). Budge quantified the loss of scans from Center to IMI during the damages period. 
Tr., 4506: 17-4509:6. As to the amount ofloss caused, Budge used a conservative analysis: if a 
doctor referring scans to IMI historically had not made referrals to Center, did not have 
privileges at St. AI's, or had privileges at more than one hospital (even if one was St. AI's), then 
scans ordered by that doctor were not counted as scans lost by Center. Tr.,4529:21-4533:17. 
Thus, Budge's analysis likely undercounted MRIA's damages by assuming that IMI (not Center) 
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would legitimately win all business from all doctors new to the area who held privileges at both 
hospitals or solely at St. Luke's. Id Indeed, under Budge's methodology, 49% ofIMI's total 
scans were not included in damages the calculations?O Tr., 4527:20-4533:17; Ex. 5000. 
Accordingly, unlike Pope, there was no assumption that MRIA's losses were equal to the 
revenue or profit of 1M!. Also, unlike in Pope, Budge assumed that Center would lose business 
to IMI due to legitimate competition.21 Compare Sager Spuck Statewide Supply Co. v. Meyer, 
751 N.Y.S.2d 318, 320 (App. Div. 2002) (it was enough for the plaintiff in a noncompete case to 
show that the defendant reaped profits from plaintiffs previous customers). 
Also, in contrast to Pope, Budge assumed that Center would lose business to other 
competitors and thus excluded from his model lost profits due to entities other than 1M!. Tr., 
4527:20-4533:17. In that regard, the partial quote from Budge on p. 22 ofSt. AI's Brief-
wherein it is suggested that Budge agreed he did not "disaggregate" his damages to include 
competition-is highly misleading, and should be ignored, as the quoted portion is actually a 
question from St. AI's counsel. Tr.,4653:24-4654:5. The answer from Budge, however, was 
"[w]ell, I think I explained that the overall competitive circumstances in the market I do think is 
considered by my methodology because they are outside of the scope of these referrals that I'm 
saying were diverted." Tr.,4564:6-10. It is disconcerting that St. AI's tries to pass off a 
statement by its own counsel as a quote from MRIA's expert when that expert flatly disagreed 
20 In contrast to Budge, St. AI's expert opined that 68% ofIMI's scans came from Center. Tr., 
6252:3-6253:10. Thus, Budge was even more conservative than St. AI's own expert. 
21 As noted above, there was significant question whether IMI would have ever even entered the 
market without St. AI's assistance. As such, Budge's inclusion ofIMI's competition is another 
indication of his methodology's conservatism. 
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with the assumption in counsel's question, and then stated the exact opposite of what St. AI's 
now contends. Even St. AI's own expert admitted that Budge's model accounted for 
competition. Tr.,6l73:1-15. 
MRIA's other expert, Charles Wilhoite, analyzed future lost profits by modeling what 
Center's profits would have been absent St. AI's wrongful conduct, predicated on what its profits 
had been before St. AI's acts. Tr., 4677-4719.22 Wilhoite, like Budge, adjusted his estimate for 
competition by using a conservative discount factor and growth rate, which the jury could 
properly accept or reject in its findings of fact. Tr.,4690:6-4698:9. This methodology has been 
approved by this Court even though other causes "may have rendered the historical averages 
questionable for determining future [profits]." Griffith, 143 Idaho at 742. The use of historical 
averages and other means of estimation go to the weight of the evidence, not its legal sufficiency, 
and thus the matter was properly left to cross examination and ultimately to the jury. Id. 
In short, none of the assumptions that were error in Pope were made in the second trial of 
this case, since MRIA's proof: (1) took into account that IMI would have won a portion of the 
market absent St. AI's involvement; (2) demonstrated that Center had the ability to assimilate the 
lost scans (Tr., 4543: 11-4544:3); (3) took into account other competitors; (4) did not assume that 
22 The Court in Pope recognized that another viable method of proving causation and damages is 
a "comparison of plaintiff s performance before and after the wrongful conduct under otherwise 
similar conditions." 103 Idaho at 236; see also Ryska v. Anderson, 70 Idaho 207, 215, 214 P.2d 
874 (1950). MRIA's method was more exacting than such a comparison because it 
dis aggregated losses due to other competition. 
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IMI's income was equivalent to Center's lost profits; and (5) only sought damages for scans that 
were lost directly to IMI.23 
c. The Evidence Amply Supports the Damages Awarded by the Jury 
Although St. AI's asserts that there is some imprecision in MRIA's damage proof, in a 
lost profits case, a "less rigid standard of proof is imposed with respect to the amount of damage" 
because economic harm is "difficult to quantify." Pope, 103 Idaho at 233. The measure of 
damages for lost profits is "rarely susceptible of accurate proof." Ryska, 70 Idaho at 213. 
Therefore, the law does not require "accurate proof with any degree of mathematical certainty." 
Vancil, 71 Idaho at 105. "The mere fact that it is difficult to arrive at [an] exact amount of 
damages, where it is shown that damages resulted, does not mean that damages may not be 
awarded; it is for the trier-of-fact to fix the amount." Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 
640,862 P.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1993). Here, MRIA's methodology proves the amount of damages 
according to the "definiteness and accuracy the facts permit[ed]." Griffith, 143 Idaho at 741. As 
noted in Pope, "[t]he (factfinder) may make ajust and reasonable estimate ofthe damage based 
on relevant data, and render its verdict accordingly" and "it will be enough if the evidence shows 
the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be only 
23 Also, in Pope the Court found that the trial court's "use of a 15% profit factor to establish sub-
market lost net profits was pure speculation. Few ofthe plaintiff insulators testified in any 
respect as to what their net profit margin was or should have been." 1 03 Idaho at 234. That is 
not the case here. Instead, MRIA's proof takes the lost scans and then applies Center's cost and 
profit structure to determine the amount of profits it lost. Tr., 4504:4-16, 4525:15-4527:19, 
4533:18-4535:22; Exs. 5083-88. Additionally, unlike the plaintiffs in Pope, Budge analyzed and 
concluded that MRI Center had the capacity to assimilate the lost scans included in his damages 
analysis. Tr., 4543:11-4544:3. 
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approximate." 103 Idaho at 233-34. St. AI's argument simply ignores Idaho law that any 
uncertainty must be borne by St. AI's, as the wrongdoer. Griffith, 143 Idaho at 741. 
In any event, any supposed imprecision must be judged against the actual evidence. 
Budge testified that to the extent there was imprecision in his damages estimate, the imprecision 
caused a significant understatement of damages rather than an overstatement. Tr., 4530: 18-
4533:17,4599:24-4601 :4. Then, when asked on cross-examination about certain purported 
errors in his analysis, Budge testified: 
Well, I don't think I'd agree that there are errors. I think that they could be better 
characterized as degrees of precision in that basically what I'm trying to do is find 
a method which is evenhanded which doesn't have a bias one way or the other, 
recognizing it can't be done with exact precision. And I think that that there is risk 
of imprecision on both sides but wouldn't call it an error in the sense that that 
might imply that the analysis wasn't technically or clerically done right or that 
type of thing. I do think that the overall conclusion that there was a massive 
migration of referrals from MRIA to IMI is borne out by the data in the aggregate 
that we also looked at. .. .I think that the other analysis of the data in the aggregate 
is quite corroborative of the conclusion. So I can't actually measure these precise 
referral patterns for these split physicians. But I know that if the allegations are 
true, that my model does a pretty good job of measuring that migration of 
referrals from MRIA to IMI over time. 
Tr., 4640:18-4643:9, 4647:3-19. Budge summed up by testifying "in terms of the amount of that 
migration, I'm highly confident that I've got a number which is evenhanded and generally 
reliable and sufficiently precise." Tr.,4642:3-18. Budge also explained that ifthere were 
significant imprecision, there would not be the symmetry shown on Exhibit 501lA (reproduced 
below), where IMI is gaining scans at approximately the same rate that Center is losing them. 
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Tr., 4647:3-4648:4; see also Exs. 4292, 4566, and 5035?4 
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St. AI's offered no evidence contradicting that important corroborating evidence. Moreover, 
although St. AI's claims the imprecision is significant, St. AI's did not present any evidence of 
the degree ofimprecision.25 In short, the law simply does not require the exactness that St. AI's 
24 As already explained, St. AI's intimation that Center is claiming all ofIMI's scans is false. As 
set forth above, under Budge's methodology, Center is actually claiming only 51% ofIMI scans. 
Tr., 4527:23-4533:17; Ex. 5000. 
25 As part of this argument, St. AI's erroneously asserts that Budge's model includes "numerous 
scans" that, had IMI never existed, would have gone to St. Luke's. Brief at 25. St. AI's, 
however, provides no evidence to support this other than the fact that Center's historical roster of 
referring physicians included physicians with privileges at both St. AI's and St. Luke's, a fact 
which does not support the assertion. Also, Budge testified that his model does not incorporate 
scans that would have gone to St. Luke's, Tr., 4530:18-4533:2, and St. AI's expert, Dr. 
McCarthy, testified he had no evidence of referrals to St. Luke's. Tr., 6227:9-6233:11. St. AI's 
argument also defies logic. If it were true that St. Luke's would have received the scans over 
Center because scans follow affiliation, then the scans would not have gone to IMI either; they 
would have followed affiliation and gone to St. Luke's, and therefore, would not have been 
counted at all by Budge's modeL 4532:17-4533:2. To this end, Budge explained that there is no 
basis for inferring that a doctor would drastically change referring patterns as suggested by St. 
AI's counsel on cross-examination: "What I'm saying is that I don't know why the doctor would 
have changed his referral patterns so radically. [In a hypothetical] he was referring nine to St. 
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asserts is necessary. Griffith, 143 Idaho at 747; Schatz v. Abbott Lab., 281 N.E.2d 323,325-26 
(Ill. 1972) ("All the law requires .. .is that the evidence shall, with a fair degree of probability, 
tend to establish a basis for the assessment of damages. "). 
Importantly, MRIA gave the jury the information it needed to make a reasoned decision. 
For example, MRIA gave the jury the number of scans referred by each referring physician. Ex. 
4425. Thus, if St. AI's could have convinced the jury that any of the referring-doctor scans 
should not be counted, it had the data from which it could deduct them. And if the jury believed 
that Center would not have legitimately won-over new doctors with privileges at St. AI's, MRIA 
also gave it the information from which those doctors (or a portion of them) could be removed 
from the damages. Id; see also Exs. 5000-5003. MRIA further gave data to the jury from which 
it could parse out the damages by year, location, and referring physician. Exs. 5067R, 5083-89, 
5091. Moreover, St. AI's itself provided the jury with alternative damage figures if it found that 
IMI would have obtained certain scans even without any bad acts by St. AI's. Tr.6196:2-
6199:7; Exs. 993C, 994B. In short, if the jury had found any ofSt. AI's damages arguments 
credible, it had the tools it needed to decrease the damages award. 
Furthermore, St. AI's intimation that the trial court simply abdicated its gatekeeper 
Luke's and one to MRIC, and suddenly he does one to St. Luke's, eight to IMI, and one to 
[MRIC]." Tr., 4596:24-4597:11. Therefore, because Budge's model only counted scans that 
went to IMI, there is no basis for St. AI's admitted speculation that Budge's model counts scans 
that would have gone to St. Luke's. In any event, the question of whether Budge's analysis over 
counts or under counts is a jury question and, again, any uncertainty must be borne by St. AI's as 
the wrongdoer. Griffith, 143 Idaho at 741; Smith v. Onyx Oil & Chemical Co., 218 F.2d 104, 
110 (3d Cir. 1955) ("[A] defendant who has broken a contract should not be allowed to profit by 
his breach because of the difficulty in fixing damages with exactness.") 
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function as to these damages is belied by the fact that the trial court did not allow MRIA to 
request profits lost to IMI's Eagle facility, but instead determined that those damages were too 
speculative, and thereby eliminated approximately $8 million in damages. Tr.,6068:24-6070:10; 
compare Ex. 5078 with Ex. 5078-R. Finally, although as the wrongdoer, St. AI's cannot 
complain about any uncertainty in the proof, St. AI's has not only complained, but it has done so 
without providing the Court, or MRIA for that matter, with any direction on what MRIA should 
have done to prove the amount of damages. Consequently, the damages the jury awarded to 
Center should be sustained as this was not a case of "rough justice," as St. AI's asserts. 
B. Mobile's Lost Profits Evidence Was Legally Sufficient 
St. AI's incorrectly asserts that the evidence of lost profits sustained by Mobile was 
insufficient under Trilogy Network Systems v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 172 P.3d 1119 (2007). 
Contrary to St. AI's assertion, however, Trilogy does not hold that a party cannot prove lost 
profit damages for breach of a non-compete clause through evidence of the breaching party's 
profits. Instead, the Court held that the trial court did not err in finding the proof of lost profits 
was deficient because Trilogy failed to introduce evidence of "any correspondence between what 
its profit would have been and [the breaching party's] actual profit, and thus failed to take the 
measure of its damages out of the realm of speculation." Id at 847. Accordingly, the premise 
behind the Trilogy decision-which involved claims that one of Trilogy's former employees 
violated a noncompetition agreement by successfully outbidding Trilogy to obtain a contract 
with one of Trilogy's customers-was that the conclusory statements offered by Trilogy that its 
profit would have been "'very similar' to the profit earned by the former employee, without 
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showing the amount of its bid and without providing any comparison between its costs to 
perform the contract and the costs actually incurred by its former employee," were too indefinite 
to support Trilogy's damage claim. Todd, 146 Idaho at 122-23 (explaining Trilogy's holding). 
Here, the facts are completely different from Trilogy. For years, MRIA had been asking 
St. AI's to allow MRIA to expand into Meridian. See, e.g., Tr., 312:15-18, 3908:5-3909:5. In 
early 2000, the MRIA Board, which included St. AI's, discussed again placing an MRI system in 
Meridian and that there was property available at 1-84 and Eagle Road, across from St. Luke's 
Hospital. Ex. 4156 at 2. In March 2001, MRIA again "inquired as to the status of magnetic 
resonance in Meridian [and] Sandra Bruce and Cindy Schamp [of St. AI's] stated that it was too 
premature." Ex. 4215 at 3. But unbeknownst to MRIA at the time, St. AI's had for months been 
planning a competing IMI imaging center in Meridian in partnership with GSR. See, e.g., Tr., 
313:19-318:13,1508:7-1513:9,2111:13-2114:2, 3912:2-3913:18; Exs. 4210 at 1,4211 at 1, 
4215 at 3. That center was eventually opened as IMI West a little over a year later, in mid-2002. 
Tr., 2061 :2-7. It was located in close proximity to the same target area MRIA had previously 
identified-near St. Luke's in Meridian. Ex. 782 at 2. MRIA, however, did not find out that S1. 
AI's was a partner in IMI West until after this lawsuit began, which was after St. AI's withdrew 
in 2004. Tr., 317:24-318: 13,3912:7-3913: 18. Thus, rather than disclosing that it was opening a 
competing IMI center in Meridian, S1. AI's continually misled MRIA while IMI's center became 
well established in Meridian.26 Under these circumstances, Trilogy is inapposite because that 
26 Even after S1. AI's opened IMI West, MRIA was still asking St. AI's about going to Meridian. 
Ex. 4287. Indeed, MRIA was a "broken record" on this issue, but even so, St. AI's failed to 
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case did not involve the taking of an opportunity to build a new facility where there would be a 
different cost structure and profit margin than any existing operations. Instead, Trilogy involved 
a situation akin to Center's claim for lost profits. fd. 
As Budge explained, unlike the diverted scan calculation for Center's lost profits-which 
applied Center's cost structure and profit margins to the diverted scans to arrive at the amount of 
damages-because Mobile's claim was that it was prevented from opening a facility in Meridian, 
there was no existing Mobile facility from which to derive a comparable cost structure and profit 
margin. Tr.,4545:15-4549:23. Consequently, the most reasonable thing to do was to assume, as 
Budge did, that Mobile would have built a center in Meridian similar to that built by IMI 
(adjusted to include only MRI). fd. Then, rather than speculating, Budge used the costs actually 
incurred by St. AI's and GSR to build and operate a facility. fd. From another perspective, the 
most credible way to determine what profits and costs would have been realized by Mobile's 
Meridian facility is to look at the best comparable facility for which data was available-and that 
was IMI Meridian. See Western Geophysical v. Bolt Assoc., 548 F.2d 1164, 1174 (2d Cir. 1978) 
(using the defendants' profits as a guide "is a much more realistic basis for the damage 
calculation than any hypothetical plan [of plaintiff s profits],,); Macke Co. v. Pizza of Gaithers., 
270 A.2d 645, 652 (Md. Ct. App. 1970) (using actual experience of competitors may be a "more 
respond. Tr.,3956:15-3957:7. MRIA did not make the move to Meridian sooner without St. 
AI's agreement because MRIA would never make any major moves like this without the 
agreement of the hospital partners. Tr., 182: 11-183:4, 199:22-200:8,3906:3-3917:5. In addition, 
as set forth supra., it should have been MRIA and not St. AI's that partnered with GSR in 
opening imaging centers in the area, such as Meridian and Eagle, but MRIA was denied that 
opportunity because St. AI's stepped in front of and destroyed those negotiations. 
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appropriate measures of damages" than "extrapolating profits"). Thus, borrowing IMI's actual 
operating numbers was not "speculative" under the governing case law, since, unlike in Trilogy, 
MRIA demonstrated a reasonable-and the best available--correspondence between what its 
profit would have been and IMI's actual profit. 
Despite the above, St. AI's asserts that Mobile's profit margin for other markets should 
have been used. Using Mobile's profit margin, however, would be comparing apples to oranges. 
Mobile, for the most part, operated mobile MRI magnets on large semi-trucks that would travel 
to rural hospitals throughout the Northwest. Tr.,3092:10-3094:7. The Meridian site, however, 
was to be a fixed magnet in a building, which obviously represented a totally different cost 
structure. Ex. 4156 at 2. Mobile was thus a poor proxy for the fixed Meridian facility, especially 
compared to the margin experienced by IMI. Moreover, while Center would have been a good 
theoretical comparable, its profit margin was higher than IMI Meridian's. Ex. 4417 at Schedules 
4 and 5 (pp. 38-39). Thus, had MRIA used Center's profit margin, the result actually would 
have been a higher damage award. Obviously, St. AI's cannot credibly complain about an 
alleged error that would have resulted in a larger damage award. Instead, IMI Meridian's profit 
margin is still the best indicator of what Mobile's profits in Meridian would have been because, 
as Budge explained, to derive a profit margin he would need to determine the costs of a building, 
the costs of equipment, the costs of personnel, etc., and the best evidence of those costs is what it 
actually cost IMI Meridian for those items. Tr.,4545:9-4549:23. Consequently, the analysis for 
Mobile's damages does not run afoul of Trilogy. (MRIA also notes that St. AI's had its 
opportunity to present an alternative number/cost structure Mobile could have used, but failed to 
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do so, leaving the jury only with only one possible number ifit found usurpation-MRIA's.) 
In addition to its Trilogy argument, St. AI's also argues that the damage award to Mobile 
should not be sustained because allegedly: (1) the reputation of the GSR radiologists was a big 
reason for IMI Meridian's success; and (2) Mobile was not precluded from opening a Meridian 
facility. These are discussed in order below, but it is worth noting initially that the jury heard 
evidence from the parties on both of these issues, as discussed below, and decided in favor of 
MRIA. As such, St. AI's is once again asking this Court to disturb the factual conclusions of the 
jury, an act which this Court almost always refuses to do. See, e.g., Boel, 137 Idaho at 12. 
1. St. AI's "Reputation of the Radiologists" Argument is a Red Herring 
St. AI's asserts that MRIA' s damage theory fails because there was "undisputed 
evidence" that the referring physicians referred to IMI because of the reputation of the 
radiologists. This is the same argument it has made with respect to its attack on Center's 
damages. As set forth in Part LA.1.b.ii, the argument fails because it ignores that but for St. AI's 
usurping MRIA's opportunity to partner with the radiologists, it would have been an MRIA 
entity with the radiologists in Meridian instead of St. AI's. It also ignores the fact that St. AI's 
was found to have conspired with the radiologists to cause the harm. Additionally, the argument 
fails because there is ample evidence that referring physicians switched for reasons other than the 
radiologist's reputations.27 Indeed, these referring physicians switched to IMI while the 
27 St. AI's asserts that "the many physicians who referred their patients to IMI Meridian" did so 
"because of the involvement of the GSR radiologists." Brief at 28. There is simply no evidence 
to support this statement. There is the testimony of a mere three referring physicians out of 
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radiologists were reading for both IMI and MRIA and thus, the reason for switching to IMI was 
something other than the radiologists' reputation, such as the fact that the radiologists, while 
working for MRIA, actively disparaged MRIA's businesses, stole patients, and provided poor 
workmanship at MRIA while St. AI's sat idly by, as discussed in the Statement of Facts, supra. 
Thus, this was a jury issue supported by substantial evidence that was decided against St. AI's. 
2. There Was Evidence From Which the Jury Could Find that Mobile Was 
Precluded From Meridian 
The evidence at trial was that by the time St. AI's withdrew and MRIA was free to open a 
facility in Meridian without St. AI's assent, the MRIA entities were so badly injured by St. AI's 
that they were no longer in the position to take advantage of new opportunities. Tr., 4032:25-
4034:3. Instead, they were fighting for the survival of their existing facilities. Id. Moreover, by 
that time, contrary to St. AI's assertion, there was evidence from which the jury could find that 
there was no room left in the market for MRIA. This is demonstrated by the fact that IMI had 
two magnets in Meridian but moved the second to Eagle rather than buying a new one, clearly 
indicating that there was not enough room in the market for two magnets in Meridian and one in 
Eagle. Tr., 4549:24-4550:23; see also Ex. 5067 (showing that as soon as moved IMI moved its 
second Meridian magnet to Eagle, the scans at IMI Meridian dropped). Furthermore, there is no 
evidence that the other competitors that moved into Meridian were in IMPs and MRIA's market 
as they had much smaller magnets for certain parts of the body. Tr., 4648:5-24,6174:19-
6175:24. Likewise, there was no evidence concerning whether these other competitors were 
hundreds, but this testimony did not relate to IMI Meridian and there was evidence to discount it. 
Tr., 5512:2-5; Ex. 4425. 
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successful. Importantly, St. AI's had the opportunity to present any contradictory evidence. The 
fact that the jury did not accept St. AI's argument is not grounds for overturning the verdict. 
C. The Jury Properly Awarded Damages Arising from St. AI's Pre-April 2005 
Conduct Even if the Losses Did Not Occur Until After April 2005 
1. St. AI's Waived the Issue as to Mobile's Damages 
St. AI's attacks the award of damages to the MRIA entities for lost profits that occurred 
after expiration of the non-compete in April 2005. Although St. AI's suggests in a footnote that 
damages for Mobile (Meridian)28 after April 2005 should be precluded in addition to damages 
for Center (downtown and campus) (Brief at n.5), St. AI's never raised this argument below as to 
Mobile (Meridian).29 Therefore, because the claim was not raised previously as to Mobile's 
Meridian-based damages, it has been waived. Doe v. Doe, 150 Idaho 432,436,247 P.3d 659 
(2011). Moreover, the claim is also waived because it is not supported by argument in St. AI's 
Brief, as its analysis in the Briefrelates solely to Budge's analysis for Center's damages. 
Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317,323,297 P.3d 1134 (2013). 
Consequently, the remainder ofMRIA's arguments on this issue, like St. AI's, will address 
Center's claims for damages after April 2005. 
2. The Jury's Finding that St. AI's Pre-April 2005 Conduct Caused Post-
April 2005 Damages Should be Sustained 
28 Although Center's damages were premised on a theory of diverted scans, Mobile's damages 
were premised on the theory that St. AI's usurped Mobile's opportunity in Meridian. Tr., 
4545:12-4546:22. Under this usurpation theory, Mobile presented evidence that St. AI's stole 
the opportunity to locate an imaging center in Meridian and that by the time St. AI's withdrew 
from the partnership, Mobile was no longer in a position to open a Meridian facility. See Part 
LA.1.b & Part LB, supra. 
29 See R., 893-895, 2332-37, 2845-47. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 41 
The trial court ruled on post-2005 damages prior to the trial, stating: 
The Court has, on numerous occasions, ruled that MRIA may recover any 
damages caused by wrongful conduct, regardless of when the damages accrue so 
long as they arise from conduct engaged in prior to 2005. The RUPA provides 
that the liability for dissociation is not exclusive, stating " ... the liability is in 
addition to any other obligation of the partner to the partnership or to the 
partners." I.C. § 53-3-602(c). Furthermore, the statute specifically spells out that 
duties apply following the dissociation of a partner. A dissociated partner still 
owes a duty ofloyalty under section 53-3-404(b)(1)-(2), and a duty of care under 
section 53-3-404(c) with regard to matters arising and events occurring before the 
partner's dissociation. Section 53-3-404(b)(1) requires that the partner hold as 
trustee any partnership property, profits, or benefit derived by the partner in the 
conduct of the business, or derived from the use of partnership property or 
information. Section 53-3-404(b)(2) requires that a partner refrain from self-
dealing or on behalf of an adverse party in the conduct of the business. Section 
53-3-404(c) requires that a partner refrain from grossly negligent or reckless 
conduct, or intentional or knowing misconduct or violations of the law in the 
conduct and winding up of partnership business. 
*** 
Consequently, a breach of any of these obligations can form a legitimate basis for 
damages regardless of whether the damages occurred prior to or after 
dissociation ... [as] there would be no need for these provisions if all partnership 
obligations were cut off due to dissociation. 
R.,2621. In response, St. AI's argued in its JNOV motion (as now) that "MRIA failed to offer 
any evidence connecting anyone particular lost scan to pre-April 1,2005 conduct.,,30 R.,4689. 
The trial court soundly rejected that contention: "MRIA's entire theory of the case was that 
Saint Alphonsus's wrongful acts effectively destroyed MRIA as a business. MRIA presented 
substantial evidence to this effect upon which a reasonable fact-finder could determine that the 
relative market positions ofMRIA and IMI were caused by Saint Alphonsus's pre-April 1, 2005, 
actions, and that these actions constituted bad acts." Id. The trial court further ruled that: 
30 For clarity's sake, the operative date for legal competition is not when St. AI's dissociated but 
rather when the non-compete expired, which was April 1, 2005 (one year after dissociation). 
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If the fact finders found that Saint Alphonsus' s had committed the alleged bad 
acts and that they occurred prior to April 1, 2005, they could clearly find the bad 
acts caused MRIA to cease being a viable market competitor, and they could then 
reasonably infer that ... an appropriately proven share of the scans going to IMI 
(both downtown and on-campus) would have gone to MRIA if it were still a 
viable competitor. The jury was fully instructed on these issues. The Court will 
not assume they did not follow the clearly articulated law governing the case. 
Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, contrary to St. AI's assertion, the MRIA entities did prove by 
substantial evidence that their damages were caused by St. AI's pre-April 2005 conduct. 
St. AI's nonetheless asserts that "MRIA never even attempted to make [the] essential 
showing" that its pre-2005 breaches caused post-2005 damages. Brief at 31. Yet the evidence 
easily allowed the jury to find that the MRIA entities suffered substantial damages as a result of 
St. AI's pre-2005 conduct. The jury could-and evidently did-reasonably infer that absent St. 
AI's misconduct, IMI, as a competitor, would more likely than not have never existed. And the 
evidence showed that Center spiraled continuously from a highly profitable business to an 
essentially failed enterprise while St. AI's was bound by the noncompete. Such evidence alone 
is sufficient to justify the lost profits damages awarded to the MRIA entities through 2015. 
Furthermore, Jack Floyd of Center testified that by April 2005, when the noncompete 
expired, "we were pretty much dead in the water, and we weren't really able to compete 
effectively." Tr. 4032:25-4033:8; see also Exs. 5011A, 5035. Floyd's testimony went 
unrebutted. He also testified that with respect to misinformation spread in early 2005 concerning 
Center's access to the digital network, "[o]ur business was on a steep decline already, and [the 
misinformation] kind of put the nail in the coffin. It changed referrals patterns very quickly." 
Tr., 4029:22-4030:2; Ex. 4533. Moreover, there was testimony that once a referring physician 
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has changed his or her referring practices, it is difficult to win that physician back. For example, 
Dr. Anderson, a referring physician called by St. AI's, testified that he switched to IMI because 
he received bad images from Center due to improper protocols. Tr., 5821 :20-5830:5. However, 
the evidence demonstrated that St. AI's co-conspirator, GSR, was purposely sabotaging these 
protocols so that referring physicians would refer to IMI rather than Center. Tr. 363: 17-364: 18, 
3727:3-3730:11,3969:12-3970:24; Ex. 4309 at 2. In this regard, Dr. Anderson testified: 
Q. Did it happen often? 
A. Well, it only has to happen a few times and then you change practice 
patterns. 
Q. Did you change your practice patterns? 
A. When I started getting scans that had to be repeated because sequences 
were included, that's probably when, at least in your list of numbers that you gave 
me, we started using-or I started using 1M!. .. more. 
Tr., 5822:4-14. Common sense dictates that once a reputation is tarnished, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to win business back. The jury readily inferred that the damage began before April 
2005 but continued thereafter because St. AI's rendered Center unable to compete by April 
2005?l Thus, St. AI's argument that MRIA did not "show how these physicians' post-April 
2005 referral decisions were influenced by years-old misconduct" is simply false. Brief at 35. 
The fact that the damage to MRIA was already done by April 2005 is also demonstrated 
vividly by Exs. 5035, 5011 and 5011A. Referring to the data that populates these exhibits, 
31 St. AI's argues that Center was not rendered unable to compete because it did obtain some 
scans from physicians who also used IMI after 2005. That argument ignores the evidence that by 
2006 those scans were almost non-existent (Ex. 5035), and that Center kept these scans because 
the referring physicians were forced to send patients to Center for insurance reasons, such as the 
VA contract that Center had. Tr., 3983:16-3985:15, 5779:3-15, 5807:3-12. These referrals were 
typically low pays which were not helping MRIA's bottom line. 3983:16-3985:15. 
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however, S1. AI's, argues that in 2005 "Center still handled 5,651 scans showing that it had 
hardly been rendered incapable of viable competition." Brief at 3 5 . Yet that scan volume was 
barely half the 9,737 scans that Center had performed in 2002, and the volume continued to 
decrease each year. Ex. 5011A; R., 1671. In 2006, the scans had been cut in half yet again from 
2005, to 2,850, and by 2009 Center did less than a tenth of the business it did in 2002. Jd This 
evidence corroborated the testimony of Center's CEO that by April 2005 "the damage had been 
done" and that Center was not able to compete or get its business back. Tr.4032:25-4034:3. 
This was more than enough for a jury to conclude that the damage done to Center before the end 
of the noncompete period was so devastating that Center was never able to recover and as a 
result, was never able to regain any of those scans. As is depicted graphically by Ex. 5011A, the 
sharp downward decline in scans started long before S1. AI's dissociated and could lawfully 
compete. Essentially, S1. AI's complains that although the evidence is clear that it pushed Center 
off the cliff before it dissociated, it should not be liable for all of the resulting damages because 
Center did not hit bottom until after S1. AI's dissociated. But as the trial court found, S1. AI's is 
liable for damages that were set in motion by its pre-April 2005 conduc1.32 
Moreover, this substantial evidence of conduct that caused the demise of Center did not 
32 In fn.6 of its Brief, S1. AI's cites several non-Idaho cases which it says demonstrate that 
damages should be cut off once a contract is terminated. None of these cases has anything to do 
with fiduciary or RUPA obligations in a partnership; indeed, most of them relate to vendor 
contracts, which are irrelevant here. This is key, because as Judge Wetherell noted in his 
decision to allow post-2005 damages resulting from pre-2005 conduct, unlike in a simple vendor 
contract, the fiduciary obligations of a partner under RUP A continue even after dissociation 
"with regard to matters arising and events occurring before the partner's dissociation." R.,2621; 
I.C. § 53-3-603. 
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significantly change between the first and second trials. Consequently, contrary to St. AI's 
argument, there was no reason for Budge and Wilhoite to change their analysis between the two 
trials. In addition, MRIA provided the jury with alternative damage figures it could use if it 
determined that St. AI's pre-April 2005 conduct did not cause damage to the MRIA entities after 
April 2005. Tr.,4574:10-4576:4. Notably, St. AI's did not provide any such evidence itself.33 
After examining the evidence, however, the jury found substantial damages were incurred after 
April 2005 which were proximately caused by pre-April 2005 conduct. None of St. AI's 
arguments justify overturning that finding of fact on appeal. Boel, 137 Idaho at 12. 
In this same connection, St. AI's attacks Budge's testimony for what he did not do to 
support his analysis of post-April 2005 damages. See, e.g., Tr., 4468:19-25. But in so arguing, 
St. AI's ignores the evidence of its multiple breaches of duty and the nature of the damages to 
Center that these breaches caused prior to April 2005. The jury could, and obviously did, 
reasonably infer that, by its very nature, such damage continued to be manifested after April 
2005. In particular, Center was essentially destroyed by St. AI's pre-April 2005 conduct-even 
33 Budge testified that if St. AI's pre-April 2005 conduct did not cause damages after April of 
2005, then there was "about $14.4 million of damages that would be removed from my model. 
So that the $46 million goes to a little less than $32. I think it's fairly close to $31.9 million, if 
you assume that all of these injuries were the result oflawful competition and not bad acts." Tr., 
4574:10-4576:4. This amount, however, included damages for usurping the Eagle opportunity, 
which the trial court later ruled were inappropriate. Therefore, if this Court does not overturn the 
trial court's ruling as to the Eagle opportunity, which is an issue in MRIA's cross-appeal, then 
the $31.9 million will need to be reduced further by $4,237,522 (the damages related to Eagle) 
for a total of $27,662,478. Thus, even ifSt. AI's pre-April 2005 conduct did not cause damages 
after April of 2005, the evidence supports a damage award of $27.6 million. Importantly, St. 
AI's provided no alternative number to the jury. Therefore, in the unlikely event the Court 
decides that damages should be reduced to pre-2005 damages only, they should be reduced 
according to the evidence at trial and not the new numbers in St. AI's footnote. Brief at 30, n.5. 
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though the destruction was not complete or fully manifested until after that time as losses were 
continuous and ongoing. This is not and cannot be refuted by St. AI' s. Yet it seemingly posits 
that the jury was incapable of both: (1) examining such facts to determine that St. AI's pre-April 
2005 conduct was a substantial factor in causing ongoing damages to the MRIA entities; and (2) 
following the trial court's repeated instructions that it not award post-April 2005 damages unless 
it found that those damages were caused by pre-April 2005 conduct. R., 3228.34 
Indeed, as to the latter-and contrary to St. AI's assertion-the trial court's Instruction 
No. 37 specifically told the jury that St. AI's was free to compete after April 2005 and further 
instructed the jury that it could not award damages lost as a result of lawful competition: 
Under the terms of the MIRA partnership, Saint Alphonsus could not compete 
against the businesses run by MRIA until one year after it dissociated, that is 
34 St. AI's asserts that Budge admitted at trial that if St. AI's was free to compete after April 
2005, then all damages after that date should be excised from his report, citing Tr., 4574-75. 
Brief at 34. St. AI's, however, failed to alert the Court that Budge specifically qualified his 
statement saying that only if "none of these damages relate to pre-withdrawal acts" and if 
competition was lawful, then would those damages would need to be excised. Tr.,4574:19-
4575:20. Additionally, the deposition exchange upon which St. AI's also relies was based on a 
question from its own counsel regarding a hypothetical world in which St. AI's had committed 
no bad acts, but still dissociated. Budge explained that he had not made a calculation for this 
hypothetical. R., 2308. He also explained that his "lost scans" calculations assumed that, had St. 
AI's not engaged in bad acts, everyone would have remained a "happy family" and that St. AI's 
would likely not have dissociated. R.,2307. Budge further explained that, in that non-existent 
world, if St. AI's had dissociated after all at some point, there would have been a natural, non-
wrongful impact on MRIA's scans. R.,2308. Additionally, Budge noted that if the jury thought 
that St. AI's would have dissociated anyway, MRIA could have lost scans due to non-actionable 
conduct because oflack of affiliation. R., 2309-10. Thus, St. AI's arguments concerning Exhibit 
889-R are completely irrelevant. However, to the extent that St. AI's believes that Budge's 
calculations are deficient in this regard, such deficiency is not grounds for excluding the expert 
testimony ofMRIA's experts, but should have been, and was, explored on cross-examination. 
Furthermore, St. AI's argument only relates to damages claimed by MRI Center, not the 
$22,349,967 awarded to MRI Mobile for St. AI's usurpation of the Meridian opportunity. 
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April 1, 2005. 
You may not award damages to MRIA, Center, or MRI Mobile based upon Saint 
Alphonsus's dissociation from the MRIA partnership-something Saint Alphonsus 
had the right to do. Furthermore, you may not award damages to MRIA, Center, 
or MRI Mobile simply because Saint Alphonsus competed with these businesses 
after April 1, 2005, which it had the right to do. 
If, however, you find that Saint Alphonsus began to compete by its actions with 
MRIA, Center, or MRI Mobile prior to April 1, 2005, or otherwise caused 
economic damages to the MRI entities by its actions prior to April 1,2005, you 
may then award damages to MRIA, Center, and MRI Mobile for any injury 
caused by Saint Alphonsus's conduct prior to 2005, even if the damages caused by 
those actions occurred after 2005. However, if you find damages should be 
awarded, you may only award damages which you find were incurred prior to 
December 31, 2015. 
R. 3228 (emphasis added). This instruction is critical, because this Court "must presume that the 
jury followed the jury instructions in arriving at their verdict." Weinstein v. Prudential Property, 
149 Idaho 299, 335, 233 P.3d 1221 (2010); see also Cookv. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26,32,13 
P.3d 857 (2000) ("it must be presumed that the jury obeyed the trial court's direction"). 
Moreover, St. AI's argument on this issue fails under governing precedent. In Bushi, this 
Court was emphatic that partners can be liable for their conduct even if they acted in technical 
compliance with their partnership agreement, if their conduct was in bad faith: 
While it is true that generally a member of an LLC is not liable to the LLC or any 
other member for actions taken in compliance with the operating agreement, the 
member must have relied on the provisions of the agreement in good faith .... 
'whether a technical breach has occurred is not the sole consideration' because 
actions taken in accordance with [an operating agreement] can still be a breach of 
fiduciary duty if [members] have improperly taken advantage of their position to 
obtain financial gain.' 
146 Idaho at 770, citing Schafer v. RMS Realty, 741 N.E.2d 155, 175 (Ohio 2000). The Court 
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illustrated this principle with the case of a capital call made to purposely dilute a partner's 
interest or using economic coercion to make limited partners sell their interests at reduced prices, 
finding that these were breaches of fiduciary duty even if they were allowed by the contract. Id. 
The Bushi Court made clear that the issue is whether the "actions were improperly 
motivated." 146 Idaho at 771. "A reasonable person could infer that Respondents acted in bad 
faith by removing Bushi from the LLC in order to advance their personal financial interests. If 
that were the case, Respondents would be liable to Bushi despite their technical compliance with 
the operating agreement." Id. (emphasis added). 
Here, the evidence readily allowed the jury to find that St. AI's acted in bad faith. Again, 
well before its technically-lawful dissociation and the subsequent expiration of the noncompete, 
St. AI's had, for approximately six years, continuously breached its fiduciary duties. Then, it 
decided to formally and technically dissociate with the intention of "sanitizing" its conduct over 
the preceding years. This made the dissociation itself part of the ongoing breaches of fiduciary 
duty in which St. AI's had been engaged well before the dissociation-or so the jury could 
properly conclude. More to the point, this places St. AI's conduct squarely within the principle 
of Bushi and nullifies any argument that the damages were legally truncated as of April 2005. 
In short, there was substantial evidence that the damages to Center were caused by St. 
AI's pre-April 2005 conduct and the jury was correctly instructed on that issue. Furthermore, 
even if the damages were caused by post-April 2005 conduct they are awardable under Bushi. 35 
35 Finally, as set forth in MRIA's Cross-Appeal at §§ IV and V, the trial court should not have 
dismissed MRIA's: (1) breach of contract claim for withdrawing in violation of the partnership 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 49 
D. The Evidence of Loss in the Value of Center Was Legally Sufficient 
Contrary to St. AI's assertion, there was no "trial by ambush" on the alternative claim for 
damages for diminution in the value of Center caused by St. AI's misconduct. That theory was 
disclosed in discovery before the first trial. Ex. 447 at 90-91. After the first appeal, but before 
the second trial, the trial court ruled: 
Notice of the claims leveled or of the defenses raised is all that is required of 
pleadings. Saint Alphonsus was on notice that damages theories were an open 
issue. In fact, this theory was specifically disclosed in discovery in the prior 
proceedings. The Court finds that this theory was adequately disclosed, and that 
there has been no discovery violation. 36 
R., 2620. Thus, St. AI's had fair opportunity for discovery into, and to defend against, this claim. 
St. AI's next argues that this theory of damages was waived, because MRIA did not press 
it at the first trial. However, there is no support for this argument, and it ignores that it was St. 
AI's, not MRIA, that obtained an order which, in effect, allowed the parties to revise their 
damage theories for the second trial. R., 730-31. Indeed, to obtain that order, St. AI's argued: 
Well, again, I think the new theory is based on the new posture of the case. It is a 
theory-it is a new theory because we have now been held to have lawfully 
dissociated in 2004 and it's a theory premised on that holding .... [W]e can't be 
held to the strategic decisions we made under that rubric when everything-and 
frankly everything has changed here .... And now that we've lawfully dissociated, 
we'd like to put in new expert analysis that addresses that critical, critical fact. ... I 
think it is really unfair [and] an abuse of discretion ... to allow MRIA to fix its 
offensive case to take into account rulings that went against it on appeal while 
disallowing Saint Alphonsus the right to change its defensive case based on the 
rulings that made the case better for Saint Alphonsus. 
agreement; and (2) breach of contract for dissociating prior to a term. Had either claim not been 
improperly dismissed, there would be no issue as to whether damages should be cut-off at 2005. 
36 St. AI's did not request to take discovery on this claim on remand. Instead it elected only to 
move to exclude the theory. R., 2423-34. 
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Hr'g Tr. (2/9110),20:6-21 :17 (emphasis added); R., 2612. Having obtained a completely new 
expert with completely new theories, St. AI's now argues the exact opposite on appeal, that 
MRIA should have been limited to the damage theories it raised in the first trial, while failing to 
inform the Court that the trial court granted St. AI's motion to obtain a new damages expert, and 
in so doing, also granted MRIA leave to file new expert reports. Jd; R., 730-31. Indeed, the trial 
court's holding was simply a recognition that SADC changed the circumstances for both sides. 
Jd Thus, while St. AI's tries to claim unfair prejudice, using its "trial by ambush" contention, 
the truth is that at St. AI's insistence, both sides were "allowed to ... react to the changed posture 
of the case." Hr'g Tr. (2/9110),36:11-21; R., 2613, 2620. 
Finally, as to this damage award, St. AI's raises the same causation arguments addressed 
in Part LA above. MRIA will not repeat its points or authorities. See Wing, 106 Idaho at 919.37 
In sum, there was no error in allowing MRIA to present its alternative damages claim for 
Center's lost value, and the evidence was sufficient for the jury's verdict on the claim. Thus, the 
adjusted award of $25,420,000 on the claim should be sustained. 
E. The Trial Court Exercised Sound Discretion in Allowing MRIA's Alternative 
Damages Claim for Disgorgement 
37 Ironically, St. AI's relies on Wing, which held: "The law does not require rigid certainty. 
Rather, it requires, as we have stated, that the evidence be sufficient to support a reasonable 
inference of causation and to allow a jury reasonably to treat that inference as more probable 
than an inference connecting the loss to other causes unrelated to the defendant's conduct." 106 
Idaho at 919. As set forth in Part LA, supra, MRIA submitted more than sufficient evidence 
supporting a reasonable inference that it was St. Al's-and not other hypothetical causes about 
which St. AI's asked the jury to speculate-which caused the MRIA's damages. See also 
Griffith, 143 Idaho at 741 (plaintiff needed not "analyze every potential alternative cause"). 
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As it contended concerning the loss-of-value damages, S1. AI's argues that the alternate 
claim for disgorgement damages "was not part of this first trial." Brief at 38. There is no law 
requiring such rigidity on remand, and again, S1. AI's itself was not limited to the theories it 
raised in the first trial. To the contrary, after disqualifying Judge McLaughlin, S1. AI's filed 
innumerable pre-trial motions, arguing new theories not raised during the first trial, and 
requesting leave to call a new expert with new analyses and opinions. S1. AI's argued: "now we 
have a changed case and ... we ought to be allowed to sort of react to the changed posture of the 
case." R., 2613, 730-31,2620. Thus, again, just as St. AI's was "allowed to ... react to the 
changed posture of the case" and change its defenses to MRIA's damages claim, it was not an 
abuse of discretion by the trial court to allow MRIA the same latitude. 
S1. AI's further argues that the alternative theory for disgorgement was not disclosed by 
MRIA until too late for S1. AI's to properly prepare to meet the theory. The trial court, however, 
remedied that alleged problem: 
Since there was an inadequate disclosure (even if it was late due to the parties' 
own stipulation to extend discovery deadlines) that may well have prejudiced 
Saint Alphonsus, the Court must determine what sanction is appropriate. The 
Court will begin by noting that Saint Alphonsus actually did depose MRIA's 
expert on this theory, and MRIA's failure to disclose was apparently not 
intentional-MRIA's expert, Bruce Budge, was clearly confused at the deposition 
as to why portions of his report were not disclosed. Furthermore, this is an eight-
week trial, and the documents necessary to develop this theory of damages are, as 
conceded by counsel for Saint Alphonsus, in Saint Alphonsus's possession. 
Given the length of the trial and the inadvertence of the vague disclosure, the 
Court finds that precluding Mr. Budge from testifying as to this theory is a harsh 
remedy that is to be avoided under Idaho law. Consequently, the Court will allow 
Saint Alphonsus to obtain an expert witness to address this theory, or allow Dr. 
McCarthy to address the disgorgement theory. 
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R.,2618-19. Importantly, when the trial court made this ruling, St. AI's did not object that the 
remedy selected was insufficient or untimely. Tr., 2150-51. Further, the disgorgement damages 
claim was not complex and did not require extensive expert analysis; the "new" evidence 
consisted of merely adding up the profits St. AI's made on its illicit venture in 1M!. Tr.,4513:8-
20; Ex. 5066. Given the sheer number oflawyers working on this case for St. AI's-at least 
eight in the courtroom for most of the trial-there was surely adequate time and resources to 
prepare a rebuttal, if any was possible, to the simple calculation of profit figures from IMI's 
financial statements. But there was no challenge to the profits MRIA calculated from those 
statements; St. AI's sole testifying expert did not address it and none other was called. 
Thus, rather than proceed in the manner allowed by the trial court and thereby avoid 
unfair prejudice to either side, St. AI's chose to stand on its demand for exclusion and not 
prepare another witness on this issue, or even inform the court that finding a new witness would 
be problematic. Its argument now that it was unable to prepare a witness because it did not have 
sufficient time is thus a classical example of an issue manufactured for appeal, and the effort 
should be rejected. It was plainly not an abuse of discretion to let MRIA present evidence on the 
disgorgement theory after giving St. AI's the opportunity to get an expert to rebut the theory. 
Kolln v. Saint Luke's RMC, 130 Idaho 323, 327, 940 P.2d 1142, 1146 (1997) (decision whether 
to admit expert testimony "will not be overturned except upon a[n] ... abuse of discretion.,,).38 
38 Although St. AI's challenges the jury's advisory finding of disgorgement damages relating to 
IMI West (pp. 41-42), the trial court did not adopt the finding (R., 3368-71) and it is not made 
part of the judgment that MRIA seeks to enforce. If St. AI's raises questions whether the 
Meridian opportunity was usurped, that question is addressed in Part I.B, supra. 
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St. AI's next argues that the usurpation ofMRIA's opportunity to partner with GSR 
occurred in 1999, and any claim for breach of duty based thereon is time-barred. The trial court, 
however, correctly held that Judge McLaughlin had decided that this claim was not time-barred, 
and that St. AI's did not appeal his ruling. Tr.,6315:4-6317:17. While St. AI's argues that the 
2007 ruling was as to a different claim, in truth, at the time it was made, Judge McLaughlin was 
addressing an argument by St. AI's that all claims of fiduciary duty arising prior to May 20,2001 
were time-barred. 2007 Tr., 6316:3-6. As such, his decision was and is law of the case. Jd. 
Moreover, even if the law of the case doctrine did not apply here, the limitations defense 
was properly rejected. Judge McLaughlin held that the misappropriation of a partnership 
opportunity was a continuing tort. Tr., 6315:4-6317:17; see also 2007 Tr., 4196:5-12. This tort 
was indeed continuous in nature. St. AI's plan to usurp the opportunity with GSR was 
implemented in 1999 (when St. AI's began sabotaging MRIA's negotiations with GSR39), but 
39 In a lengthy footnote on pp. 39-40, St. AI's argues that the evidence does not support a finding 
that GSR was close to a deal with MRIA before St. AI's interfered. But once again, this is 
nothing more than a fact issue for a jury to decide, not an appellate court. See, e.g., Boel, 137 
Idaho at 12. Moreover, contrary to St. AI's arguments, all MRIA must show to prove usurpation 
is that it had either "an interest or a reasonable expectancy" in getting a deal done with GSR, not 
that the parties had a fully-negotiated contract in front of them when St. AI's stepped in. Jenkins 
v. Jenkins, 138 Idaho 424, 428,64 P.3d 953 (2003) (emphasis added). There is no dispute here 
that MRIA had "an interest" in getting a deal done with GSR, which should end the inquiry. In 
addition, there was plenty of credible evidence introduced at trial upon which the jury could 
reasonably conclude that MRIA and GSR were, in fact, very close to a deal at the time St. AI's 
usurped the opportunity, even if a few points remained to be negotiated. For example, GSR's 
Dr. Hall privately reported to GSR in late spring of 1999 that "a partnership with MRI is very 
close to being finalized." Ex. 4079 at 2 (~L) (emphasis added). Indeed, GSR felt so confident 
about the finality of a deal with MRIA that it voted to "give the negotiating team discretion in 
finishing the negotiations." Similarly, another set of confidential GSR meeting minutes from 
around the same time states that "MRI negotiations are close to being complete," and that the 
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was not completed until July 2001 (when St. AI's formally partnered with GSR in IMI). See the 
Statement of Facts, supra; Ex. 4226. In 2000, MRIA asked St. AI's, its negotiating agent, to 
forward on a better offer to GSR, but St. AI's never passed it on--even though it admitted it had 
a fiduciary duty to do so-and never told MRIA that GSR did not receive it. Tr.,283:8-286:21, 
970:16-971:3,1336:16-1338:19,1341:3-1344:15; Ex. 4137. In the meantime, throughout 2000 
and the first half of2001, St. AI's was continuing to negotiate with GSR to co-opt the 
opportunity ofpartnering with GSR. Exs. 4177, 4182, 4192, 4199, 4226; Tr., 996:17-1000:2, 
1010:22-1011 :6. Those negotiations culminated in St. AI's alone partnering with GSR in IMI in 
July 2001. Ex. 4226; Tr., 1780:15-1781:2. Thus, the misappropriation was not completed until 
the 2001 agreement between St. AI's and GSR was reached. 
This Court has reasoned that "[ s ]ince usually no single incident in a continuous chain of 
tortious activity can 'fairly or realistically be identified as the cause of significant harm,' it seems 
proper to regard the cumulative effect of the conduct as actionable." Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 
"Group would like to finalize the MRI partnership [with MRIA] quickly to help make the 
hospital negotiations smoother." Ex. 4077 at 3 (emphasis added). In addition, Dr. Prochaska-a 
major player in these negotiations-stated that when Bruce stepped in "we just about had the 
deal done." Tr., 249:17-252:16, 762:11-17; see also, Tr., 949:14-950:8. Against all this, St. AI's 
does little more than contend that the 100-mile radius was an issue, and then asks this Court to 
decide as a matter of law that the testimony from a few self-interested witnesses in a second, 
multi-million-dollar trial taking place a decade after the events transpired should be more 
persuasive than the unambiguous statements made by the radiologists behind closed doors at a 
time when no one at GSR had a reason to misrepresent the true nature of the negotiations. 
Moreover, it is notable that much of the evidence cited by St. AI's of the negotiations 
drifting mostly takes place after St. AI's was asked to negotiate on MRIA's behalf in June 1999. 
Tr.,256:19-257:18. And most tellingly, the radius issue which St. AI's says was the cause of the 
friction was only there because St. AI's itself (along with the other hospitals) had insisted on it. 
Tr.,256:19-258:3. That is, St. AI's is both the author of the friction, and its beneficiary. 
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598,603-04,850 P.2d 749 (1993) (quoting Page v. Us., 729 F.2d 818, 821-22 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
On the basis of that continuous tort concept, the Curtis court upheld the trial court's refusal to 
instruct its jury on a limitations defense. Id.; see also Brenner v. United Bhd. O/Carp., 927 F.2d 
1283, 1295 (3d Cir. 1991) (if"a defendant's conduct is part of a continuing practice, an action is 
timely so long as the last act evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations 
period; in such an instance, the court will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would 
otherwise be time barred."). Therefore, because MRIA's May 20,2005, Counterclaim was filed 
within 4 years of the culmination of the continuing tort in July 2001, this breach of fiduciary duty 
claim is not time-barred even if J. McLaughlin's analysis is not the law of the case. 
Next, St. AI's argues that the Court should have reduced the disgorgement damages by 
$11.2 million to reflect St. AI's investment in 1M!. However, for its disgorgement remedy, 
MRIA sought only the "dividends" or profits realized by St. AI's from IMI through 2015, not St. 
AI's ownership interest in 1M!. Therefore, it would be illogical to offset the disgorgement award 
by St. AI's investment because, even after it disgorges its ill-gotten profits, St. AI's will still have 
the value of its investment in IMI, as a going concern. MRIA's expert testimony on this very 
point went uncontradicted at trial (Tr., 4521 :2-16), and the trial court agreed. R.,2616-19. Thus, 
the alternative award of disgorgement damages by trial court should be affirmed. 
II. ST. AL'S WAS GIVEN A FAIR TRIAL ON FIDUCIARY DUTY 
While St. AI's tries to provide its second section with a unifying theme-fiduciary 
duty-in truth, pp. 42-58 are better characterized as a jumble of mostly unrelated evidentiary 
complaints. None need detain the Court for long: St. AI's is plainly wrong on all counts, and 
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even if it were correct, a new trial would only be "merited if the [evidentiary] error affects a 
party's substantial right." Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 156,45 P.3d 810,812 (2002). As is 
clear below, none of St. AI's complaints come anywhere near affecting a "substantial right." 
A. St. AI's Arguments Concerning Bushi, Dr. Wilson, Exs. 4234 and 4239, and 
Certain Jury Instructions Ring Hollow 
1. The Trial Court Simply did not Construe Bushi as St. AI's Alleges 
St. AI's starts this section with a discussion of Bushi. Essentially, its arguments are 
twofold: (1) that the trial court incorrectly adopted MRIA's interpretation of Bushi to include 
claims for breach of fiduciary duty even when a party is technically compliant with RUP A; and 
(2) that as a result of this misinterpretation, the trial court incorrectly allowed evidence of St. 
AI's profit motives. Brief, pp. 43-45. Both arguments are contradicted by the record. 
As to the first issue, MRIA initially notes that St. AI's attempts to distinguish the case at 
hand from Bushi are unavailing. St. AI's argues that Bushi was limited solely to technical 
compliance with partnership rights under a partnership agreement, and the case at bar dealt with 
technical compliance with partnership rights under a statute. !d. Obviously, MRIA considers 
this a distinction without a difference, since in both cases a partner is acting pursuant to his 
express rights, but is nonetheless violating his fiduciary duties. Notably, why the source of the 
partnership rights should matter is never explained by St. AI's. Id 
That said, the truth is that, as it relates to St. AI's evidentiary complaints, this argument is 
moot regardless because St. AI's actually won on this issue. Contrary to St. AI's arguments, the 
jury was never instructed that "dissociation plus bad motivation could breach fiduciary duties." 
Id Instead, as even St. AI's own excerpt oflnstruction 50 shows, the jury was instructed only 
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that technical compliance with the partnership agreement "plus bad motivation" could result in a 
breach of fiduciary duty: 
A partner may adhere to the strict legal requirements of a written agreement, in 
this case the MRI partnership agreement, and still be held responsible for 
violating a fiduciary obligation to its partners if the action taken was improperly 
motivated, such as taking advantage of its partnership position to obtain financial 
gain. It is for you, the jury, to determine whether an alleged action has taken place 
and, if it is otherwise in compliance with the terms of the MRIA partnership 
agreement between the parties, whether the action was improperly motivated. 
R., 3242 (emphasis added). This is an exact statement of what St. AI's Brief argues Bushi's 
language should be held to, and plainly says nothing whatsoever about any statutory rights. 
Indeed, at the jury instruction conference, the trial court said it would draft it this way in 
response to the precise concerns St. AI's is complaining of now: "I agree that it should be made 
clear that what we are talking about here is the MRIA partnership agreement." Tr., 6397:21-
6402:25 (emphasis added). The court then added language to the Instruction to make clear that it 
was the "MRIA partnership agreement" which was being referred to, at which time St. AI's 
agreed at least twice on the record that the Instruction was a correct statement of Bushi: "It is 
obviously correct, Your Honor is right, that it does come from the Bushi case.,,40 Id. And 
notably, no other citation from St. AI's Briefwherein it erroneously alleges that the trial court 
was attempting to tie statutory dissociation to Bushi ever took place in front of the jury. 
In short, while MRIA believes that Bushi's language means that a statutorily-compliant 
40 Once the court agreed to make this change, St. AI's then argued that while it was a correct 
statement oflaw, it need not be given because it would unduly help MRIA. Tr.,6397:21-
6402:25. Thus, while it is technically true that St. AI's made "repeated objections" to Instruction 
50 (Brief at 44), it is highly misleading to suggest that by the end those objections had anything 
to do with an incorrect interpretation of Bushi. 
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act can nonetheless result in a breach of fiduciary duty, just as a contractually-compliant act can, 
there is simply no evidence that the jury was ever so much as exposed to this argument, let alone 
that it found for MRIA on that basis. Certainly St. AI's cites to none. 
St. AI's second contention-that the trial court only allowed evidence ofSt. AI's profit 
motives because it misread Bushi-is equally specious. Again, St. AI's own citations indicate 
that St. AI's convinced the court that its interpretation of Bushi was correct, so the idea that the 
trial court allowed evidence of St. AI's profit motives due to MRIA's interpretation of that case 
is far-fetched. But far more fundamentally, St. AI's profit motives were germane to dozens of 
issues arising before its dissociation (and thus having nothing to do with either party's 
interpretation of Bushi), many of which St. AI's affirmatively put into play itself. 
F or example, just as it relates to the pre-dissociation issues presented in St. AI's own 
Brief, there were questions at trial concerning: whether St. AI's was truly powerless to do 
anything about its radiologists' unlawful behavior, or whether it was purposefully sitting on its 
hands for financial reasons (pp. 49-53); whether St. AI's was ever truly trying to find a "one big 
happy family" approach, or whether it was usurping the deal for its own pecuniary benefit (pp. 5, 
39, fn.12, 55); whether St. AI's had incentive to inform MRIA about its negotiations with, and 
huge investment in, IMI prior to dissociation (pp. 54-55, 57); and whether it was Dr. Giles and 
DMR that made St. AI's working relationship with MRIA difficult, or whether its own profit 
motive was the true cause of the friction (pp. 55-56). And again, this is even putting to side 
several major arguments at trial which did not find their way to St. AI's Brief, chief among them 
its most repeated theme, which was that everything it did related to MRIA and IMI was done to 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 59 
ensure quality "patient care," not to maximize profits.41 In short, St. AI's profit motives were 
relevant regardless of Bushi, and thus admissible. See IRE 402; Daniel v. Moss, 93 Idaho 612, 
614,469 P.2d 50 (1970) (evidentiary rulings will be sustained on any valid ground). 
2. Dr. Wilson 
St. AI's recitation of the Dr. Wilson issue is confusing, leaving out much of the relevant 
context to explain the trial court's decision. When GSR's Cliff testified, he was asked why the 
radiologists wanted to go out on their own in the first place. Tr.,894:15-898:21. Cliff primarily 
testified that they were nervous about job security at St. AI's because there had been a group of 
pathologists (including Dr. Wilson) who had contracts similar to that of the radiologists, but who 
St. AI's fired suddenly and without any explanation whatsoever. Id As such, when St. AI's 
CEO, Bruce, took the stand, she was asked whether she "terminated Dr. Steven Wilson's 
contract and never told them why." Tr., 1174:21-1176:6. But as was true with so many other 
difficult questions at trial, Bruce's memory conveniently failed her here and she could not "recall 
that he was never told why." Id This set the stage for Dr. Wilson to testify, since a self-serving 
"I can't recall" is proper grounds for impeachment. See Preuss v. Thomson, 112 Idaho 169, 171, 
730 P.2d 1089 (Ct. App. 1986). And in his testimony, Wilson was limited to impeachment 
topics: that he was fired, that he was not told why, and nothing more. Tr., 2900:4-17, 2907:11-
2910:7. 
Contrary to St. AI's arguments, the court cited several independent grounds in allowing 
this testimony, but never mentions Bushi as being one of them. Among other things, the 
41 Tr., 102:1-103:8, 108:9-109:6,125:2-129:5, 1668:24-1677:6, 1830:20-1832:3,2564:4-2565:8. 
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testimony was allowed to show pre-dissociation friction between the parties and St. AI's alleged 
monetary motive related thereto, to impeach Bruce, and to contradict St. AI's oft-repeated 
allegation that it always wanted to be aligned with its physician groupS.42 Tr.,2890:7-2895:7. 
These other grounds are not even discussed-let alone challenged-in St. AI's Brief, and they 
obviously contradict St. AI's statement that the "only conceivable relevance" for Dr. Wilson's 
testimony was to demonstrate "monetary motivations and thus wrongful dissociation." Brief at 
47; see also Daniel, 93 Idaho at 614 (evidentiary rulings will be sustained on any valid ground). 
Moreover, the impeachment purpose of the evidence eliminates St. AI's argument that the 
testimony was impermissibly admitted as character evidence, since impeachment is an exception 
to Rule 404(b). State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496,501-02,988 P.2d 1170 (1999). 
3. Exs. 4234 and 4239 
As with Dr. Wilson, St. AI's explanation of Exs. 4234 and 4239 leaves out much of the 
relevant context. (These two exhibits are the two Shattuck Hammond memoranda which this 
Court discussed at length in SADC. 148 Idaho at 489-90.) Contrary to St. AI's allegations, it 
mostly won its motion to have these exhibits redacted; the court, largely for the concerns St. AI's 
is expressing now, removed several pieces oflanguage which MRIA wanted to use. R, 1350-51. 
42 The trial court mentions motives for "dissociation" as well, but does so in the context of 
arguments which St. AI's itself was making at the time: " ... Saint Alphonsus believes ... that their 
actions in dissociating and that their acts leading [to it] were taken only because of tensions 
which were created by the disputes between the radiological group the MRIA partnership and the 
affiliated MRI entities and Saint AI's ... " Tr., 2890:17-2891 :10 (emphasis added). This accords 
with Bruce's testimony, elicited by St. AI's counsel, a few weeks earlier that she wanted to stay 
partners in MRIA, but that she ultimately had to leave because the tension between GSR and 
MRIA became too great. See, e.g., Tr., 1831 :4-1832:3. St. AI's cannot be heard to complain that 
MRIA was allowed to introduce testimony on an issue which St. AI's chose to put into play. 
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But the court also found that the language concerning the risk of breach of fiduciary duty should 
remain because it could be relevant to MRIA' s claims. Id And while St. AI's acts now as 
though that decision were based on Bushi, once again the court says nothing of that case in its 
decision. Id Instead, it was responding to MRIA's argument that the relevant sections in these 
exhibits were discussing a buyout ofMRIA's interest, and that the litigation language could be 
read to mean that S1. AI's was told early on that it needed to complete that buyout or risk 
violating its duties. R., 1099-1101. Certainly, this was not an abuse of its discretion, which is 
the relevant standard. Jen-Rath Co. v. Kit MIg. Co., 137 Idaho 330, 336,48 P.3d 659 (2002). 
4. The Jury Instruction 
S1. AI's arguments concerning the jury being informed that its dissociation was lawful are 
baffling. Brief at 47-48. Not only did the trial court include Jury Instruction 5, which S1. AI's 
admits informed the jurors that dissociation does not violate the law, but it also included 
Instruction 37-a fact that St. AI's has somehow neglected to bring to this Court's attention. As 
noted above, that instruction specifically states that S1. AI's "dissociated from the MRIA 
partnership on April 1, 2004 pursuant to its right to do so under Idaho law." R., 3228 (emphasis 
added). One wonders how much more clearly Judge Wetherell could have told "the jury that [S1. 
AI's] had 'rightfully' or 'lawfully' dissociated." Brief at 48. S1. AI's failure to even discuss this 
dispositive instruction in its Brief should give the Court serious pause. 
B. St. AI's Arguments Concerning the Radiology Contracts are Unfounded 
S1. AI's next argues that it was prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to enter a directed 
verdict stating that St. AI's lacked the contractual ability to tell GSR to read Center's scans, 
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because, according to it, that decision allowed MRIA to argue that when S1. AI's "failed to 
compel GSR to provide 2417 contrast coverage to Center, it breached its fiduciary duty to 
MRIA." Brief at 49 (emphasis in original). This argument was brand new at the second trial, 
and caught St. AI's speaking out both sides of its mouth, since S1. AI's had taken the exact 
opposite position in the first trial. As might be expected, S1. AI's about-face led to several 
uncomfortable exchanges for its witnesses, who were forced to try to somehow recant prior 
testimony wherein they unambiguously stated that the radiology contracts did, in fact, obligate 
GSR "to provide or perform all radiologic medical imaging services required at the medical 
center .. .including MRI." Tr., 4276:3-4282: 17 (emphasis added) (Carolyn Corbett, St. AI's 
officer over radiology, impeached on this issue); Tr., 2036:12-2039:10 (same, Cindy Schamp). 
And even putting this full-scale reversal to the side, the standard here is very deferential. 
"When reviewing the disposition of a motion for a directed verdict ... , this Court must determine 
whether, admitting the truth of the adverse evidence and drawing every legitimate inference most 
favorably to the opposing party, there exists substantial evidence to justify submitting the case to 
the jury." General Auto Parts Co. v. Genuine Parts, 132 Idaho 849, 855, 979 P.2d 1207 (1999) 
(internal quotes and brackets omitted). Such evidence exists here. 
1. Even St. AI's Interpretation of the Radiology Contracts Would Result in a 
Breach of its Fiduciary Duties 
S1. AI's is simply wrong about the verbiage of the contract, as explained below. That 
said, the initial and most fundamental problem with its argument is that even if St. AI's was 
correct, that fact would have no effect on whether it violated its fiduciary duties to MRIA. This 
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is because either interpretation ofthe radiology contracts-whether St. AI's or MRIA's-would 
have resulted in the same breach of fiduciary duty. 
In particular, the evidence presented at trial was overwhelming that the parties agreed that 
the hospitals-including St. AI's-would provide radiologists to read all of Center' slMobile' s 
images at their respective institutions. Tr., 290: 1-298:22. The late Dr. Curran stated that each of 
the hospitals had given "assurance" in the beginning that this would be the case; and Chris 
Anton, St. AI's CFO at the time of formation, testified that this had in fact been the way it had 
occurred. Ex. 4498 at 2; Tr., 3802:12-3804:13. Moreover, that service had always been on a 
2417 basis. See, e.g., Tr., 4074:6-4075:24. Thus, Joe Messmer, a former executive at Mercy 
Medical, testified that pursuant to this agreement, he required the radiologists at his hospital to 
read images on a 2417 basis, and that St. AI's had an obligation to do the same. Tr., 2630: 10-
2631:3,2652:20-2654:17. Even St. AI's executives concurred that there was an agreement to 
this effect. Tr., 1171:6-19,2036:12-2039:10. 
All of this is critical, because even if St. AI's current interpretation of the radiology 
contract was to be accepted, St. AI's would still be agreeing that it breached its fiduciary duty by 
entering into deficient agreements in the first place. That is, under MRIA's interpretation, St. 
AI's violated its fiduciary duties by not enforcing the contract, and under St. AI's interpretation, 
it violated its fiduciary duties by knowingly choosing to tie its own hands in agreeing to a 
contract which lacked a clause that obligated GSR to read Center's images. Either way, the 
result is the same-St. AI's deliberately left its partners high and dry. It is for this reason that the 
trial court also ruled, in addition to its contractual ambiguity decision, "that it is not the 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 64 
enforceability of the contract at issue here. It is whether [St. AI's] was meeting its duties to the 
partnership in providing radiologists for the MRI entities." Tr.,6065:14-6066:11. St. AI's has 
not contested this dispositive ruling, which should end the inquiry. 
Moreover, even if St. AI's had no contractual right to insist on performance, it does not 
follow that the jury could not have found that St. AI's had no power to compel the radiologists to 
read at Center. Cliff largely agreed that St. AI's ability to not renew contracts created a "culture 
of fear" with her doctors generally, such as with Dr. Wilson. Tr.,927:24-929:8. And the 
evidence was clear that even with GSR, St. AI's had often used this same "leverage" to extract 
concessions when she felt the issue was important. See, e.g., Ex. 4199, p. 2, Tr., 1008:25-
1010:13. Yet St. AI's CEO, Bruce, testified that she pointedly refused to even!rY to use that 
same influence to get GSR to simply continue doing what it had been doing for nearly two 
decades: reading Center scans competently on a 2417 basis. Tr., 1179:2-1181 :22. To this, Joe 
Messmer testified that contract or no, the radiologists at his hospital (Mercy) would never have 
been able to act as GSR did, because he would have had a meeting in which he told them to tow 
the line or to leave. Tr.,2651:17-2654:17. Thus, with or without a contract, the jury could 
reasonably conclude that St. AI's had the ability to oblige GSR to read, but chose not to use it. 
2. At Bestfor St. AI's, the Contracts are Ambiguous 
St. AI's argues that both the 1997 and the 2001 radiology contracts did not apply to MRI 
services at Center. This is incorrect. The 1997 agreement, at § 1.1.1, states that the radiologists 
were required to provide "services required in the Medical Center," including that of "Magnetic 
Resonance." Ex. 4033. Similarly, § 1.3.1 of the 2001 agreement states that the radiologists were 
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to provide the services in the "Medical Center," one of which was "magnetic resonance." Ex. 
4229. However, it is undisputed that the only MRI services provided on St. AI's campus at that 
time were at Center. Tr., 190:2-10,4239:8-22,5707:25-5708:19. As such, these clauses would 
be rendered meaningless if the services at Center were not intended to be included, which is 
obviously problematic, given that a court must give effect to every provision of a contract. Ace 
Realty v. Anderson, 106 Idaho 742, 749-50, 682 P.2d 1289 (Ct. App. 1984). It is for this reason 
the trial court found that these sections alone caused a fact issue. Tr., 6065: 14-6066: 11. 
In addition, § 1 of the 1997 agreement states that the radiologists "shall perform all 
services generally and customarily performed by the Medical Center hospital-based radiologist 
group." Ex. 4033, p. 2 (emphasis added). As discussed above, there is no dispute that GSR had 
been reading Center's images on a 2417 basis at Center for over a dozen years by the time of this 
agreement. Tr., 1171 :6-19,3786:23-3788:5,3801 :4-3803: 12. Under any definition of the term, 
this service had clearly become "customary" by 1997 and was thus required under the contract. 
Next, § 1.3.2 of the 2001 Agreement required the radiologists to provide 2417 services "in 
the Department." Ex. 4229. The "Department" is defined as the "Department of Radiology," 
which is located "on the first floor of the Medical Center and provides a broad range of 
radiologic and medical imaging services to patients in connection with other care provided in the 
Medical Center and to patients who are referred on an outpatient basis solely for radiologic or 
medical imaging services." Id., p. 4 (~ C) (emphasis added). This is an exact description of 
Center at the time: it was found on the first floor of the Medical Center; it was one of the many 
imaging services found there; it served hospital patients; and it also served outpatients "solely 
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for. .. imaging services." R., 2816; Tr., 3800:5-3804:5. Moreover, St. AI's former CEO, Chris 
Anton, testified that Center was actually considered part of the "Saint Alphonsus radiology 
department." Id As such, the agreement's terms clearly covered the services at Center. 
Moreover, at least two of GSR's signatories to the 1997 agreement-Drs. Giles and 
Prochaska-testified that they executed it believing that it did cover Center's MRI services for 
the reasons mentioned above. Tr., 193:6-194:13,855:9-858:11,4236:3-4242:21,5707:25-
5708:19. Similarly, Jeff Cliff, GSR's lead negotiator in 2001, stated that he understood § 1.3.1. 
to require GSR to read at Center. Tr.,2956:4-2957:4. Likewise, St. AI's had the same belief. 
Tr., 2036: 12-2039: 10,2132:21-2133:2; 4276:3-4282: 17. This is key, since if "the parties 
attach[] the same meaning to the contractual term, it is to be interpreted in accordance with that 
meaning." USA Fertilizer v. Idaho First, 120 Idaho 271, 274, 815 P.2d 469 (Ct. App. 1991).43 
Against all this, St. AI's contends that § 1.1.1 of the 1997 agreement and § 1.3.1 of the 
2001 agreement speak only to services in the "Medical Center," which St. AI's argues as 
somehow excluding Center. Brief at 50-52. But again, those are the exact sections described 
above which indicate that GSR was to provide "magnetic resonance" services, even though 
Center's MRI machines were the only ones on St. AI's campus. St. AI's argument is accordingly 
43 Furthermore, § 8.1 of the 1997 agreement states that the radiologists have were required to 
read on any equipment owned by St. AI's located on the "medical center campus." Bruce 
admitted that Center's "equipment" was located "on campus" (Tr., 1158:11-15), and Dr. Giles-
who took lead on the negotiations for GSR on this agreement-stated that St. AI's did have an 
ownership interest in the MRI equipment and for that reason believed that Center was covered in 
the agreement he negotiated: "it owned the building and it owned-by being a part of MRIA 
owned at least a part of the equipment." Tr.,4236:3-4238:16. Notably, even Bruce 
unintentionally suggested this was a reasonable interpretation when she admitted that St. AI's 
often referred to Center as being "Saint AI's MRI." Tr., 1168:13-24. 
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contradicted by the very section it relies upon for its arguments. 
St. AI's responds to this difficult fact with two conflicting contentions. First, it states that 
the term "Medical Center" does not include Center because St. AI's reading of the evidence is 
that it does not own Center. This argument fails because the evidence was clear that Center was 
physically located in the "Medical Center" and that both parties understood that Center was 
owned by St. AI's, at least partially. Tr., 1168:13-24,4236:3-4238:17. 
Secondly, St. AI's argues that the trial court erred by referring to undisputed evidence 
introduced at trial demonstrating that there were no other MRI services at St. AI's, because that 
was looking outside the document itself. Yet this is exactly what St. AI's is asking this Court to 
do with its "ownership" argument. That is, St. AI's was forced to cite trial testimony-i.e., 
evidence from outside the contract itself-in order to try to prove that Center is an "ancillary 
operation" to the hospital, because there is nothing in the agreements themselves which indicates 
Center's ownership or operation one way or another. Brief at 50-51. Furthermore, St. AI's 
arguments ignore that an ambiguity can be either "patent" or "latent." A patent ambiguity is one 
which is on the instrument itself, while a latent ambiguity only "becomes apparent when 
applying the instrument to the facts as they exist" and is a "well recognized exception" to the 
parol evidence rule. Estate o/Kirk, 127 Idaho 817, 824, 907 P.2d 794 (1995). In this case, there 
was clearly a latent ambiguity: the "facts as they exist[ed]" were that there was no MRI services 
at St. AI's other than those provided by Center. In sum, there is a mountain of evidence strongly 
indicating that its current self-serving interpretation of the radiology contracts is flawed. The 
trial court was absolutely correct to make this a jury issue. 
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3. St. AI's Incurred no Prejudice as a Result of this Decision 
Finally, St. AI's claims of prejudice are undeniably weak. The trial court never barred St. 
AI's from arguing its novel interpretation of these contracts to the jury; instead, it simply refused 
to grant St. AI's construction as a matter oflaw.44 As a result, St. AI's was free to advance its 
construction to the jury as often as it liked, and did so repeatedly. See, e.g., Tr., 1163: 19-
1164:17,2391:18-2393:4,3013:12-3015:13. 45 Indeed, one wonders why, ifSt. AI's 
interpretation was as obvious as it contends, it was unable to convince the jury of its logic. 
C. The Profit Motive Rulings do not Raise a Reversible Issue 
St. AI's concludes its Section II with a scattershot of random evidentiary objections. 
These arguments are taken in order. 
That the court erred by disallowing Schamp's testimony about what she said to Dr. 
Curran. St. AI's argument has changed over time on this issue, which explains much of the 
confusion it alleges. While it argues now that it only wanted to introduce the "fact that these 
conversations occurred" (Brief at 54), meaning that they might have a non-hearsay purpose, at 
trial, it solely asserted that Schamp's statements could not be hearsay because she was testifying 
to them herself. R.,2592-98. Given that argument, the trial court made the correct decision, 
44 St. AI's changes its argument slightly but significantly in its conclusion. On p. 49, St. AI's 
only asks for reversal based on the fact that the trial court failed to grant a directed verdict. But 
on pp. 52-53, it modifies that argument to be that the court somehow erred by "allowing MRIA 
to repeatedly assert a non-existent legal right." Lest there be any confusion, the first time St. 
AI's asked for the court to adopt its interpretation as a matter of law-and thus to the exclusion 
of any other interpretation-was in its directed verdict motion, 6 weeks into an 8-week trial and 
after MRIA's case-in-chief ended. R., 2813-23; Tr., 4775:23-25. 
45 MRIA notes that all of these same witnesses were impeached on this very issue. Tr., 1156:4-
1168:24 (Bruce), 2036:12-2039:10 (Schamp), 2956:4-2957:4 (Cliff). 
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since there is no right under the hearsay rule for a witness to introduce her own out-of-court 
statements. See State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 223-24, 207 P.3d 186 (Ct. App., 2009). But in 
its post-trial JNOV motion, St. AI's changed its rationale and asserted that there was also a non-
hearsay purpose to Schamp's testimony. R.,3892-93. The trial court agreed with this new 
argument, and therefore found that the testimony may have been admissible. R.,4697-98. 
Putting that issue to the side, however, the trial court was absolutely correct that there 
was no prejudice here. When it made its decision at trial, it also stated that its ruling was 
preliminary only-that Schamp could testify as to her conversations with Dr. Curran if the "door 
was opened" in some other way. Tr., 1910:14-1912:20. That door was clearly opened, since 
Schamp testified repeatedly that she informed Dr. Curran of the status of the negotiations with 
GSRJIMI. See, e.g., Tr., 2059:10-24, 2232:12-2233:23, 2266:17-2272:4, 2292:16-2294:3, 
2326:20-2338:20,2342:20-2345:11, 2356:14-2357:5, 2443:18-2444:15, 2524:6-24. And 
contrary to St. AI's Brief, Schamp testified not just to the fact of her conversations with Dr. 
Curran, but also to the content. Id As such, regardless of the trial court's decision, St. AI's 
experienced no actual prejudice. 
That the court erred by disallowing Schamp's testimony about the alleged Arid 
Club incident. St. AI's is correct that the trial court excluded the evidence here under Rule 403. 
Essentially, St. AI's intended to take a communication from Dr. Giles, wherein he allegedly 
asked Schamp to let him know what Ms. Bruce was "up to," and turn it into full-scale corporate 
espionage-an argument St. AI's continues in its Brief. Tr., 2272:23-2283:7; Brief at 55. The 
trial court found that the evidence here, while possibly relevant, was confusing because even if 
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true, there was no indication that Dr. Giles was acting on MRIA's behalf and because there were 
several different interpretations of what the term "up to" meant in this context. Tr., 2281: 15-
2283 :7. This is key, since "[i]t is well established that a trial court has considerable discretion to 
exclude evidence for reasons that the evidence is confusing or could have been interpreted in 
many different ways." Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 186,219 P.3d 1192 (2009). 
St. AI's admits on p. 55 of its Brief that its only purpose in presenting this evidence was 
to paint Dr. Giles as "scurrilous." There are two interrelated problems with this. First, the law 
does not provide an excuse for St. AI's to violate its contractual and fiduciary duties simply 
because it found Dr. Giles--or anyone else at MRIA--difficult to deal with. As such, its 
relevancy is questionable, at best. Second, this story was just one of many pieces of evidence St. 
AI's used to try to paint Dr. Giles as irascible. Indeed, St. AI's took the better part of a day 
cross-examining Dr. Giles, in which it attempted show him as greedy and conniving, using no 
less than 29 other exhibits for that express purpose. Tr.,5611-5720. St. AI's then spent the lion 
share of its closing arguments reviewing that same evidence, mentioning Dr. Giles by name an 
astounding 92 times. Tr.,6688-6805. Thus, the problem for St. AI's was not that it did not have 
opportunity to excoriate Dr. Giles, but that jury just did not seem to care, most likely because, 
again, the "Dr. Giles made us do it" defense was no defense at all. 46 
46 St. AI's also argues in a lengthy footnote on p. 53 that the court erred by allowing Cliff to be 
impeached when he said he did not remember telling Dr. Giles that Cliff and Schamp had 
discussed that the "cheapest thing" for St. AI's to do in relation to MRIA was wait. But again, 
Idaho law allows for rebuttal evidence to an "I don't recall" response. Preuss, 112 Idaho at 171. 
Moreover, the trial court was cognizant of St. AI's concerns, and took pains to read to the jury a 
very clear instruction explaining the limited purpose for which the testimony could be used. Tr., 
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That the court erred by disallowing St. AI's to refer to itself as "nonprofit." St. AI's 
arguments concerning this issue are faulty for two reasons. First, as the court found, "nonprofit" 
is a misnomer. R.,2082-83. Under 28 USC § 501(c)(3), St. AI's is not a "nonprofit," but instead 
a "charitable" organization. Thus, while the trial court disallowed the term "nonprofit," it also 
ruled that S1. AI's could mention that it was a "charitable organization." Id. St. AI's fails to 
explain why this latter term does not accomplish the same end of diffusing its "profit motive and 
greed." Second, though MRIA obtained this ruling prior to trial, the truth is that St. AI's 
witnesses often referred during trial to St. AI's as "nonprofit" without MRIA's objection. See, 
e.g., Tr., 2167:4-2172:18, 3690:20-3691:7. Indeed, Schamp testified at length that St. AI's was a 
"nonprofit," and thus it had different incentives than for-profit hospitals, switching back and 
forth between the terms "nonprofit" and "charitable" as though they were synonymous. Tr., 
2167:4-2172:18. St. AI's alleged prejudice here is accordingly non-existent. 
That the Court erred in its ruling concerning the Idaho Business Review article. St. 
AI's next argues that it was improper to exclude the Idaho Business Review article during Dr. 
Prochaska's initial testimony. St. AI's argument is erroneous. First, it solely complains that the 
document was kept out on the grounds of hearsay, yet the record says that the trial court kept it 
out on foundational grounds instead. Tr., 812:4-813:5; R, 4698. St. AI's is accordingly 
contesting a decision that was never made. Second, as St. AI's admits, once Dr. Seabourn 
testified, the article was admitted. Tr., 5336:23-5337: 19. At that time, St. AI's had the option of 
4411 :19-4414: 1,4418:2-23. This should end the issue, since a putative "[e]rror in admission of 
evidence may be cured by proper instruction, and it must be presumed that the jury obeyed the 
trial court's direction." Cook, 135 Idaho at 32. 
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calling Dr. Prochaska back to ask him about it, yet it chose not to do so. As such, St. AI's has no 
one to blame but itself for not questioning him about the article. Nor can it simply be assumed, 
as St. AI's urges, that the jurors' minds were already made up by the time it was admitted since, 
to the contrary, they were specifically instructed not to make up their minds until the close of 
evidence. See, e.g., Tr., 98: 11-25. Again, this Court "must presume that the jury followed the 
jury instructions in arriving at their verdict." Weinstein, 149 Idaho at 335. 
That the Court erred in its ruling concerning Carl Harder's invoices. St. AI's 
arguments concerning Carl Harder omit the key fact that the court excluded his invoices on Rule 
403 grounds, and thus the standard here is abuse of discretion. Schmechel, 148 Idaho at 186; 
Hr'g Tr., 56:12-25 (9/2111). St. AI's argued below, as it does now, that these invoices somehow 
imply that GSR and St. AI's could not have been engaging in untoward behavior because GSR 
may have used the same attorney as MRIA. Id,49:25-53:12. But the trial court found that 
whatever the minimal relevance of these invoices to that argument, their admission without 
Harder's testimony to explain his role would leave the jury to guess as to what they meant, 
including whether Harder may have had a conflict of interest. Id,56:12-25. And given that his 
death in 2002 meant that he could not clarify what he perceived his role in that process to be, the 
jury would be left to speculate about what he "did or did not do or what he understood his 
function was or was not." Id This is dispositive, since again, the court has wide discretion with 
evidence which could be "interpreted in many different ways." Schmechel, 148 Idaho at 186. 
D. St. AI's Misunderstands the Law-of-the-Case Doctrine. 
St. AI's Brief also contains a handful of undeveloped and erroneous allegations that the 
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law-of-the-case doctrine was misapplied. Much of St. AI's confusion apparently emanates from 
its misstatement that Judge Wetherell held "the parties to stipulations and tactical decisions made 
at the first trial." Brief at 60. It is true that Judge Wetherell held the parties to their evidentiary 
stipulations because, as he noted, those stipulations caused Judge McLaughlin to make un-
appealed evidentiary decisions. R., 2080-82; see also R., 1520-58 (most exhibits admitted by 
stipulation in 2007). But he never held the parties to their "tactical decisions," a truth which may 
be best illustrated by the fact that St. AI's introduced an entirely new defensive damages theory 
and an entirely new radiology contract interpretation at the second trial, as noted above. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S JOINDER DECISION WAS SOUND 
St. AI's seems to admit that, based on the relation-back standard in Rule 15(c), its 
statutes-of-limitation arguments are irrelevant if joinder of Center and Mobile (jointly, the 
"Limiteds") was allowed. As such, it focuses most of its time on why joinder was improper, 
arguing almost exclusively that the expiration of time should foreclose that possibility. Brief at 
58-60. Yet the court's decision to allow joinder, which spanned several pages and considered all 
of St. AI's arguments (R., 570-79), is once again protected by an abuse-of-discretion standard. 
Trimble v. Engelking, 130 Idaho 300, 303, 939 P.2d 1379 (1997). And in using that discretion, 
the trial court found that the circumstances leading to the joinder more than explained the timing 
issue, demonstrated good faith on the part ofMRIA, and showed a lack of prejudice by St. AI's. 
In December of 2006, MRIA sought leave of Judge McLaughlin to file a counterclaim, in 
which it asserted causes of action on behalf of the Limiteds. In its briefing and at the hearing on 
this issue, MRIA asked that if the court found that MRIA could not pursue claims on the 
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Limiteds' behalf, they should instead be joined to the action as real parties in interest. See, e.g., 
2007 Tr., 275: 1-22. Judge McLaughlin ruled that this joinder was unnecessary since MRIA 
could pursue the claims on their behalf. 2007 R., 868-71. MRIA therefore filed a Second 
Amended Counterclaim consistent with this holding on March 2, 2007, well before the running 
of any statute of limitation. 2007 R., 868-71, 905-46. On appeal, this Court reversed, ruling 
that the Limiteds needed to bring their own claims. SADC, 224 P.3d at 1086. The Court did not, 
however, suggest that on remand this real-party-in-interest defect could not be cured. Id 
Based on these facts, the Judge Wetherell allowed for joinder after the remand. His 
decision was expressly guided by this Court's admonition that joinder should be liberally granted 
to "further the policy favoring the just resolution of actions-providing litigants their day in 
court." Hayward v. Valley Vista Care, 136 Idaho 342, 348, 33 P.3d 816 (2001); R., 574. In 
addition, Judge Wetherell relied on this Court's instruction that "the good faith of the plaintiff 
and the prejudice experienced by the defendant are factors to consider." Id. Notably, St. AI's 
discusses neither factor in its Brief. 
As to good faith, the trial court found that only reason the Limiteds were not joined 
sooner was because Judge McLaughlin said it was not required. Indeed, one wonders if there is 
a better justification for not joining a party than reliance on a court decision specifically stating 
that it is unnecessary. As Judge Wetherell found, "the Court finds that it was a reasonable 
mistake (ifit can truly be called a 'mistake' given the trial court's order) not to join the limited 
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partnerships prior to this point in the litigation." R., 578 (emphasis added).47 
Furthermore, St. AI's has not incurred any prejudice as a result of this decision, since the 
nature of the allegations against it did not change with the joinder, only the identity of the 
accuser. That is, in the first trial, St. AI's was defending itself from MRIA alleging that it 
harmed the Limiteds, while in the second trial, it was defending itself from the Limiteds accusing 
it of harming the Limiteds. St. AI's does not dispute this, but instead states ambiguously that its 
"prejudice" is an allegedly uneven application of the law-of-the-case doctrine. This is false, but 
in the context of this argument is a tacit admission that it was not harmed by the joinder itself. 
Indeed, St. AI's subsequently used the joinder decision as an excuse to obtain an entirely new 
damages expert who then advanced an entirely new damages theory. R., 731, 2611-13. Thus, 
not only is there no prejudice here, the decision provided it with a distinct tactical advantage. 
Indeed, St. AI's sole argument seems to be that too much time had passed to allow for an 
amendment. But Judge Wetherell may have dealt with this issue best when he gently reminded 
St. AI's that the entire process has taken quite some time: "In light of the trial court's ruling that 
MRIA could bring the claims on behalf of the limited partnerships, the length of the trial, and the 
length of the appellate process, the Court does not find that the amount of time to correct the 
mistake is unreasonable." R., 579. 
Indeed, this case is very similar to that of Conda Partnership v. MD. Canst. Co., 115 
47 To this, St. AI's alleges that this must have been a tactical decision on MRIA's part, even 
going so far as to drop a footnote explaining all of the reasons MRIA might have chosen to not 
have the Limiteds sue. Brief at fn.59. Notably absent from this footnote is any actual evidence 
demonstrating these allegedly nefarious intentions, which are simply not true. 
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Idaho 902, 771 P.2d 920 (Ct. App. 1989). There, as here, a substitution was sought for a 
subsidiary in place of the parent. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision to 
disallow that substitution, using language that could just as well be describing this case: 
Here, Conda gave an understandable explanation of why it was named as plaintiff 
instead of Beker, based upon the relationship between a managing partner and the 
partnership .... The underlying facts giving rise to this action are understood by 
both parties. [Defendant] has not indicated it was unsure about the events at issue. 
From our review of the record, Conda appears to have acted in good faith. There 
is no indication that [defendant] has experienced any real prejudice because of the 
time span involved. A great injustice would result if the legitimate claims were 
defeated by the simple error of form when the mistake is so easily corrected. 
Id. at 904. A "great injustice" would result under the facts of this case as well. 
IV. ST. AL'S APPORTIONMENT ARGUMENTS ARE CONTRARY TO LAW 
St. AI's next argues that the trial court erred in the manner it apportioned the damages. 
All of its arguments are contrary to law. First, St. AI's argues that Idaho's Contribution Among 
Tortfeasors Act, I.C. § 6-802 et seq., should be applied to contract claims as well. Brief at 61-62. 
Obviously, this is illogical on its face: the statute applies only to "'joint tortfeasors" and defines 
that term to mean two "or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort." I. C. § 6-803(4) 
(emphasis added). Plainly, a ','breach of contract is not a tort." Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Canst., 
99 Idaho 462, 468, 583 P .2d 997 (1978). In hopes of circumventing this clear conclusion, St. 
AI's argues that by alleging conspiracy, MRIA somehow turned its contract claim into a tort 
claim, but cites no legitimate authority for this proposition. Indeed, St. AI's Am. Jur. citation on 
p. 61, by its terms, relates solely to tortious interference with contract, rather than with breach of 
contract itself, and then says the exact opposite of what St. AI's cites it for: "Where a third party 
influences a contracting party to breach his or her contract, the innocent contracting party has a 
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right in breach of contract against the other contracting party and a right in tort against the third 
lli!!1Y.,." Am.Jur.2d Interference § 55 (emphasis added). Similarly, the language attributed to CJS 
in St. AI's Brief simply does not exist in the cited section, or anywhere else MRIA can find. 48 
To the contrary, many jurisdictions who have considered this issue have found that "a 
person who is not a party to a contract cannot be bootstrapped into a conspiracy tort." See, e.g., 
In re Singh, 457 B.R. 790, 805 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Cal. 2011); CTTI Priesmeyer v. K & 0, 164 S.W.3d 
675,685 (Tex. App. 2005). Likewise, even in just the context of the Uniform Contribution 
Among Tortfeasors Act, several courts have found that their respective states' statutes do not 
encompass contract actions. See, e.g., Fidelity and Dep. v. Bondwriter Southwest, 228 Ariz. 84, 
88-89,263 P.3d 633 (Ariz. App. 2011) (Act was not "intended to apply to an ordinary breach of 
contract claim"); D.R. Horton v. Travelers Indem., 281 F.R.D. 627, 632 fnA (D. Colo. 2012) 
(same); Dameshek v. Encompass Ins., 2011 WL 3627384, *4 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (same). This is 
true even when there was, to use St. AI's verbiage, "a single injury" which gave rise to multiple 
causes of action. See Cooper Indust. v. Tarmac Roofing, 276 F.3d 704, 716 n.1 0 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(statute in Mississippi only applied to joint tortfeasors; thus even though defendant's liability 
stemmed both from contract and tort claims, damages could not be apportioned). 
Second, St. AI's erroneously asserts that the jury somehow acted inconsistently when it 
found 100% liability for fiduciary duty, but only 90% for intentional interference and 80% for 
48 Possibly, the CJS section previously had something relevant to say on this subject, but MRIA 
has been unable to locate this superseded section electronically, in the Idaho state law library, or 
as quoted in any reported American case. And to the contrary, CJS makes clear in related 
sections that conspiracy requires the commission of an underlying tort. See CJS Conspiracy § 8, 
entitled "Underlying Tort Claim" (emphasis added). 
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conspIracy. Brief at 62. As an initial matter, the trial court fixed this error when it decreased the 
intentional interference to 80%, as St. AI's recognizes in a footnote, but somehow neglects to 
incorporate into its argument. R., 4691-93. Nor is this action inconsistent with the court's 
decision not to also decrease the fiduciary duty award. As the trial court reasoned, a far more 
logical interpretation than that offered by St. AI's is that "the jury rejected the idea that Saint 
Alphonsus acted in concert with any other entity to breach its fiduciary duty." Id. And this 
ruling is compelled by this Court's admonition that "where there is a view of the case that makes 
the jury's answers consistent, it must be resolved in that way.,,49 Lopez v. Langer, 114 Idaho 
873,878, 761 P.2d 1225 (1988). 
Third, St. AI's contention that "pro rata" can only mean "equal shares" each is clearly 
contradicted by Idaho statutes. Contrary to St. AI's suggestions, the term "pro rata" is actually 
capable of several reasonable meanings. For example, in National Union Fire v. A.A.R. Western 
Skyways, 784 P.2d 52,57 (Okla. 1989), the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered the definition 
of the term "pro rata," and found that while "equal shares" was one possible meaning, the much 
more likely meaning in the context of a contribution statute would be "proportionate, as based on 
one's degree of fault." It stated: "[t]o have one tortfeasor 1 % at fault and another 99% at fault 
and yet, make them split equally their liability in a contribution action seems as harsh and 
49 Moreover, that the same acts may have provided the evidentiary basis for the claims of 
intentional interference, breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy does not alter the fact that they 
are entirely different claims with different elements, and that it is appropriate for jury to 
separately consider the fault of the parties on each claim. 
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irrational as not having contribution at all." Id 50 
Thus, the key question becomes what the Idaho legislature meant by this term. 51 
Happily, this question is easily answered because the both the statute itself and the case law 
interpreting it clearly indicate that the term "pro rata" in this statute means in proportion to the 
relative fault of the individual defendants. Indeed, in I.e. § 6-806 itself, the legislature stated 
that "[t]his section shall apply only if the issue of proportionate fault is litigated between joint 
tortfeasors in the same action." Id (emphasis added). Obviously, this statement cannot be 
squared with St. AI's interpretation of "pro rata"; either the judge is to simply perform St. AI's 
headcount idea, or the jury is to apportion liability according to fault, as § 6-806 specifically 
requires. It cannot be both, unless St. AI's is seriously urging that the legislature meant for Idaho 
juries to engage in the laborious exercise of determining the relative culpability of the parties, 
only to immediately have that finding discarded in favor of a judge's headcount. 
Similarly, I.C. § 6-805(2) allows for a reduction of damage awards against settling 
tortfeasors, but only if the agreement so provides and "the negligence or comparative 
50 See Hindy v. Bousquet, 1975 WL 169940, **3-4 (R.I. Super. 1975) (stating that St. AI's "equal 
shares" definition would lead to an "absurd" result in the context of a contribution statute); see 
also McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 211, 114 S. Ct. 1461 (1994) (because it has too 
many competing meanings, "[ w]e have deliberately avoided use of the term 'pro rata. '''). 
51 Even this would not end the inquiry, since under the language ofI.C. §§ 6-805 and 6-806, it is 
not enough that St. AI's prove that the legislature meant "pro rata" to be a simple headcount, but 
must also prove that when GSR and MRIA settled, they intended St. AI's doubtful meaning in 
the agreement as well. St. AI's has not so much presented allegations on this issue in its Brief, 
making its request for reversal impossible to grant. Given this lack of argument, MRIA will 
simply note that the evidence below was that St. AI's headcount definition was affirmatively not 
what GSR and MRIA intended when they used the term in their settlement agreement. See R., 
1045-49, referring to R., 995-1009. 
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responsibility of the tortfeasor receiving the release is presented to and considered by the finder 
offact." As the trial court found, this verbiage "suggest[s] that apportionment of fault is 
necessary where ajoint tortfeasor is released." R., 1378-81. 
Furthermore, this Court's interpretations of § 6-806 are consistent with "pro rata" being 
proportionate fault. For example, in Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 782-84, 727 P.2d 1187 
(1986), this Court discussed a "Pierringer release," in which "nonsettling defendants will not be 
required to pay more than their fair share as determined by the jury's finding of comparative 
negligence." Id (emphasis added). It then noted that these types of releases "are generally 
approved by the courts and are consistent with I.C. §§ 6-805 and -806." Id (emphasis added). 
Obviously, if the term "pro rata" exclusively meant to simply conduct a perfunctory headcount, 
then this Court could not logically have found that a release which envisioned a "finding of 
comparative negligence" later could be "consistent with" § 6-806. Id; see also R., 1378-81. 
Likewise, in Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 119 Idaho 299, 805 P.2d 1223 (1991), 
this Court held that "[ c ]ontribution is available only when a party has paid more than its pro rata 
share of a judgment," referring to the "pro rata" language in § 6-803. Id at 309 (emphasis 
added). Then, in the very next sentence, it found that "[b ]ecause we remand for a new trial, it 
will be up to the trier of fact to determine the relative negligence. if any, among the parties." Id 
(emphasis added). That is, this Court stated that the determination of a "pro rata share of a 
judgment" depended first on a trial court ascertaining "the relative negligence" of the parties. Id 
St. AI's construction of the term to mean equal shares simply cannot be squared with this ruling. 
V. ST. AL'S IS NOT ENTITLED TO INTEREST FROM DISSOCIATION 
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St. Al' s asserts that it should be entitled to interest dating to dissociation, because 
according to it, interest is governed by RUP A. Brief at 64. The problem with this argument, to 
quote the trial court at R., 4701-02, is that RUPA: 
applies only to the extent that the partnership agreement is silent on the issue of 
interest. See I.e. §§ 53-3-103(a); 53-3-701, cmt 3. Section 6.2 of the partnership 
agreement [Ex. 4023] provides that no interest will be paid to dissociating 
hospital partners on their partnership shares, thus the agreement is not silent on 
the issue of interest, and the RUP A default provision does not apply. 
VI. ST. AL'S IS NOT ENTITLED TO FEES AND COSTS. 
MRIA takes issue with St. AI's statement that "if the Court rules for Saint Aiphonsus, 
then Saint Alphonsus, not MRIA, will be the prevailing party." In the unlikely event St. AI's is 
the prevailing party on appeal, most of St. AI's grounds would require a re-trial, not a judgment 
for St. AI's and thus, according to SADC, no non-appellate fees or costs would be awardable yet. 
224 P.3d at 1090-91. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, MRIA requests this Court deny St. AI's appeal and award 
MRIA its attorney fees and costs. 
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of June 2013. 
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Affiliated Physicians per Budge Send Ina Patients to Both MRiC and IMI 
MRIC IMI 
ReferrlClll Physldan 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Mar-11 Tolal 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Mar-II Tolal 
AGNEW. ANN 6 49 52 12 156 23 27 39 85 51 41 45 8 319 
ANDERSEN. BRUCE J 100 58 65 47 25 10 1 313 112 152 151 130 153 172 153 126 119 134 34 1,436 
ANGLETON. PETER J 78 72 57 53 19 3 282 3 26 54 52 79 72 87 17 390 
ASHAYE. JAIYEOLA 1 5 2 8 2 19 8 5 34 
ASHBY. HANSEL 84 41 62 41 26 
-
254 1 4 63 57 53 36 41 4 259 
ASHER. STEPHEN 18 18 7 1 57 10 36 65 91 93 74 35 61 58 124 21 668 
BADKE. FREDERICK R 4 1 5 1 1 1 2 5 
BEARDMORE. DAVID F 38 25 24 19 23 129 3 33 23 59 
BEASLEY. DONALD J 1 3 1 5 5 1 1 1 3 3 2 16 
BINEGAR. WILLIAM 8 51 27 10 24 7 1 1 1 135 56 70 48 39 29 64 50 53 43 61 11 524 
BINNION, DIANNA LEE 26 33 54 23 16 152 3 49 29 48 33 47 11 220 
BISHOP, JOHN E 175 161 91 12 6 445 17 29 55 40 2 143 
BOESIGER. BRIAN M 10 43 23 76 2 2 57 46 62 43 24 3 239 
BORUP. MARK D 10 3 6 1 20 1 1 1 1 5 6 15 
BOSTICK MARC W 1 1 1 2 1 6 1 2 1 2 6 
BOUCHARD. JULIA KEITH 1 5 6 2 1 15 1 1 4 8 1 4 19 
CARE. STEVEN B 1 2 2 1 3 3 1 15 1 1 1 1 15 59 65 66 18 227 
CHANDLER. JEFFREY L 3 3 1 1 1 2 1 6 
CLARK, EDWIN M 12 10 6 1 29 1 2 6 4 2 1 2 18 
CLIFFORD. KEVIN A 22 15 25 34 9 105 5 3 1 9 
CLINE. MARTHA 32 11 1 1 68 51 92 130 119 154 230 156 94 121 160 33 1.340 
COLLINS, CAROLYN 125 48 1 - 174 4 4 8 
COLLINS. PAUL C 4 4 1 1 10 2 6 11 55 4 5 16 n 22 5 2 205 
CONKLIN, MATTHEW 9 35 56 39 
-
139 4 42 49 58 29 11 193 
COOPER, CLIVE 15 29 30 26 46 18 177 3 4 5 20 27 24 31 51 7 172 
COTHERN. BRIAN E 2 5 2 8 3 1 1 22 1 4 1 6 
COUGHLIN. MICHAEL J 26 18 17 16 7 6 94 3 3 8 13 25 11 58 66 89 57 8 341 
COULAM, CURTIS 1 1 1 1 2 4 
CULPEPPER, SCOTT 
-
1 1 4 7 16 45 30 1 103 
CURRAN, JOHN R 1 1 6 6 
CUSHMAN, AUSTIN R 5 3 8 5 1 23 1 4 6 8 8 31 33 33 40 164 
DAINES, JOSEPH G 50 42 49 29 17 4 1 195 3 1 2 9 32 40 64 42 42 26 261 
DAVEY. IANC 1 - 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 11 
DAVEY, NEIL C 1 4 7 • 12 1 2 2 3 5 1 2 16 
DAVIDSON, JAMES R 2 2 21 37 21 21 16 116 
DJERNES. MICHAEL R 83 89 84 44 38 18 12 1 2 374 9 79 25 34 20 41 48 22 13 22 313 
DOERR. TIMOTHY E 215 47 127 85 32 6 516 178 45 240 296 274 255 144 163 108 138 29 1.890 
DURNING, CARL 2 20 19 39 21 7 123 2 3 2 5 28 27 12 6 6 91 
DZIECZKOWSKI. JEFFERY S 8 4 18 22 28 30 32 34 4 150 
EISELE. STAN 1 28 36 27 20 126 2 3 4 9 30 24 32 29 7 140 
FAZZIO. FRANK J 4 2 1 7 1 1 
FENDER. FRED W 51 25 18 15 13 122 4 55 113 78 51 54 71 50 51 70 19 616 
FLOYD. CHARLES T 81 71 10 13 15 4 197 69 84 68 65 14 18 30 37 29 25 1 440 
FONG, WAYLAND B 15 15 15 13 9 3 8 4 84 1 1 8 13 4 6 2 8 13 4 1 61 
FORSYTHE. ALICE 93 131 73 76 21 7 406 23 37 42 43 79 94 128 119 117 149 23 854 
FRIZZELL, ROY T 39 43 10 49 22 13 3 3 3 194 143 75 28 n 98 101 112 66 110 147 26 983 
GAGE, RICHARD D 10 14 6 9 10 1 1 2 53 7 2 2 2 4 13 4 3 3 40 
GAMBOA. JOHN E 20 31 23 8 2 84 123 92 117 141 151 145 150 104 78 79 12 1.192 
GARABEDIAN, VICKEN 3 5 3 - 11 3 5 6 5 2 2 1 2 26 
GIBSON. MICHAEL P 54 57 46 56 53 1 268 1 1 6 6 66 76 48 39 45 2 296 
GILBREATH. ERIC C 1 3 2 6 3 5 3 3 3 17 
GOBEl. REGINALD J 1 1 1 2 2 5 
GDODWlN, THOMAS E 36 21 21 11 4 4 1 101 127 27 39 106 116 141 171 96 80 59 7 971 
GOUCHER. NICHOLAS 2 1 4 2 2 4 
GOUGH. DAVIDT 31 33 39 32 28 163 7 35 42 26 14 25 4 153 
GREEN. LAWRENCE E 45 24 15 9 10 18 28 5 2 4 2 175 7 6 19 11 10 18 26 27 35 35 5 199 
GREENWALD. NANCY 14 14 30 10 6 6 84 97 109 155 161 129 66 153 141 122 105 7 1.265 
GRIGGS. HILLARD 11 28 32 18 89 31 42 27 1 6 107 
GROSS, DOMINIC L 9 4 1 2 1 17 61 62 58 57 96 66 59 64 66 25 674 
GUICHETEAU, JOHN E 18 34 27 34 12 3 130 1 5 4 11 6 5 10 9 1 52 
HALL. JHON R 2 2 1 1 1 3 
HAN. ALLEN 82 144 92 62 22 28 23 12 485 53 99 84 82 122 119 101 121 125 177 32 1.1 15 
HENBEST, MICHAEL L 147 164 38 14 12 10 3 1 3 5 424 In 136 67 143 101 104 96 82 118 77 16 1.117 
HENZLER, MARK 42 36 51 23 17 1 170 1 26 12 27 12 17 1 96 
HERROLD. JAMES M 74 73 72 64 42 20 11 1 1 372 76 141 190 105 147 145 92 66 89 73 8 1.132 
HESSING. JEFFREY G 6 6 14 6 9 1 1 3 47 4 6 4 5 5 12 12 8 16 1 73 
HILL. DOUGLAS M 4 18 7 5 34 I 2 8 8 15 7 4 10 55 
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Scan Data for 2001 to March 2011 (MRIC Annualized for 2006) 
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Referring Physician 2001 2002 2003 2004 
HINE,JOHNM 2 
HODSON, STEPHANIE 17 51 46 
HOOPES, SCOTI 1 1 
HUANG, POY 29 31 21 21 
HUNT,LlSAM 23 49 25 
JOHANS, TIMOTHY J 108 66 34 43 
JOHNSON, MARK 35 29 28 39 
JOHNSTON, JAMES M 39 15 14 15 
JOLLEY, DAVlDW 
JONAKIN, WILLIAM 13 4 9 4 
JONES, MARGARET M 1 
JUTZY, RONALD E 190 207 153 44 
KIM, DAVIDT 45 17 7 32 
KLEIN, FREDERICK J 21 12 25 15 
KLOSS, JOHN G 50 43 28 11 
KNOCHEL, JOHN Q 3 
KNORPP, DANIEL STEWART 
KNUTSON, CHRISTINA M 1 6 2 
KOENIG, MICHAEL 6 
KOEPlIN, DAVIDA 47 52 40 44 
KRISTENSEN, RONALD M 123 148 57 9 
LAWLER, CHRISTOPHER 7 
LAWRENCE, STEWART 2 3 3 
LENZI, WILLIAM D 5 2 9 3 
LEWER, GREGORY S 5 7 7 6 
LEWIS, KIRK J 10 2 3 
LINDHOLM, KARIN M 124 138 112 101 
LIVINGSTON, JOHN M 29 37 11 6 
LOWRY, RONALD E 1 
LUND, MARTHA H 1 2 1 2 
LUQUE, MARION 1 5 
LYONS, GEORGE R 132 153 177 75 
MACDONALD, SANDRA K 1 1 
MACHA, MATIHEW R 4 9 1 2 
MADERIOUS, ALAN M 12 41 
MADSEN, JULIE M 28 17 2 
MAIER,ERIC 72 95 78 93 
MAIER, MICHAEL K 39 43 32 37 
MALLER, NANCY T 5 17 36 
MANNSCHRECK, MOLLY J 7 2 1 4 
MANOS, RICHARD E 
MARSH, DANIEL 
MASSART, MYLYNDA B 
MCGEE, DENNIS R 4 1 1 2 
MCKIM, THOMAS D 1 
MCKINNON, RYAN S 1 3 1 
MCMULLAN,KATHRYN 1 
MEHTA, SNEHLATA P 29 32 24 41 
MEIER, MARK C 116 113 101 20 
MERCHANT, JENNIFER 2 2 
MERCY, MICHAEL R 13 30 14 29 
MILLER, MARK R 8 7 2 
MINAS, MICHAEL R 3 4 
MITCHELL, JANET 
MOCK, DALEL 39 47 21 47 
MOHR, JOHNJ 17 16 1 
MONTGOMERY, RICHARD 6 
MOORE, MONTE H 15 15 8 5 
MOORE, RICHARD E 128 190 193 163 
MORRIS, DONALD 9 
MUNN, STACIA 
MURRAY, WILLIAM T 1 
NEGRON, ROBERTO A 2 1 
NEWCOMBE, EDWARD H 53 53 55 38 
NOVAK, CHARLES C 6 10 7 2 
OBRIEN, PM 7 2 7 1 
ODONNELL, JANAT 5 3 
MRIC 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2008 2010 Mar-l1 Total 
2 
24 8 6 158 
1 4 
20 122 
11 108 
20 3 1 3 280 
21 13 1 175 
2 85 
1 1 
1 1 32 
1 
57 8 4 1 670 
18 119 
20 93 
132 
3 
1 1 
1 10 
5 11 
7 
-
190 
4 
- 1 342 
6 
-
1 14 
3 
-
11 
-
19 
7 3 37 
2 17 
87 44 10 3 1 3 854 
3 - 1 87 
1 
5 1 13 
1 - 7 
45 6 1 4 597 
2 4 
8 1 28 
14 3 72 
24 
-
71 
78 51 2 505 
28 32 2 1 2 239 
46 104 
13 3 9 2 43 
- 2 1 3 
3 1 6 
2 2 
1 9 
-
1 
5 
-
1 
17 3 148 
24 
- 1 375 
4 
25 111 
17 
3 10 
1 2 4 
21 6 1 2 168 
34 
5 
-
11 
1 1 3 49 
42 6 6 1 723 
17 1 28 
1 1 2 
1 
. 3 
28 1 2 ;; 1 237 
5 30 
5 3 27 
2 4 17 
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IMI 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Mar-l1 Total 
7 5 1 13 
1 10 13 35 81 155 138 141 162 32 768 
1 2 1 1 5 
2 36 30 27 12 7 1 115 
1 29 5 17 8 12 7 13 1 93 
95 139 179 141 131 157 129 60 88 115 18 1,262 
8 12 18 22 15 14 35 24 18 15 4 185 
52 59 85 39 14 19 20 10 30 33 16 377 
1 1 
15 30 17 29 16 10 13 9 20 6 185 
1 2 2 3 1 9 
144 132 167 119 115 121 120 96 74 37 15 1,140 
1 3 21 36 33 28 37 16 175 
3 29 19 44 26 27 2 150 
17 28 63 28 19 9 9 40 72 30 10 323 
1 1 1 2 1 6 
1 3 2 6 
1 1 2 6 10 
1 25 42 5 32 54 62 66 71 5 363 
4 15 24 28 93 78 242 
10 29 86 51 16 5 8 14 14 16 1 250 
3 8 12 14 12 25 28 102 
5 5 3 3 2 1 19 
2 3 12 14 14 11 17 6 11 2 92 
24 30 15 29 22 11 29 17 22 17 5 221 
63 59 68 50 75 66 2 403 
23 36 30 53 T7 113 151 239 227 183 28 1,158 
2 1 4 4 8 4 7 9 5 2 46 
1 1 2 
4 3 1 2 5 1 16 
1 1 1 3 1 6 13 
99 105 109 182 106 157 136 151 203 230 16 1,494 
1 1 2 
1 3 5 2 12 16 3 10 9 2 63 
4 16 5 19 21 49 10 14 13 7 158 
5 1 3 1 10 
19 8 15 8 19 29 75 53 43 34 3 306 
44 53 47 60 54 37 62 61 50 32 6 505 
1 45 54 100 
1 2 2 5 
7 1 8 
129 237 229 287 252 39 1,173 
2 1 3 
1 1 3 8 5 13 21 7 7 66 
2 1 3 
2 1 3 
1 2 3 6 5 2 4 2 25 
5 3 2 16 41 35 25 13 11 4 155 
B 17 60 136 136 138 166 123 121 130 24 1,069 
4 6 10 8 8 1 37 
1 10 26 1 38 
1 2 3 1 7 
2 31 17 5 12 11 18 15 27 8 146 
2 18 13 2 2 37 
3 6 19 12 5 11 21 36 32 15 160 
1 1 
1 3 1 5 1 11 
2 22 19 11 12 25 37 80 70 60 15 373 
1 3 18 96 163 129 175 180 158 20 943 
1 6 7 
1 6 9 9 13 38 
1 1 2 4 
1 1 1 3 
2 5 26 9 39 41 40 37 30 26 10 285 
1 1 2 3 1 1 9 
105 70 69 38 11 19 52 41 40 20 1 466 
1 4 2 2 1 1 1 12 
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Referring Physician 2001 2002 2003 2004 
OSTER. SHARON E 44 59 48 25 
PALMER, KYLE L 6 10 3 3 
PETERSEN,ROBERTL 5 34 
POGUE, BRYAN C 48 23 30 18 
POGUE, WILLIAM A 3 6 2 
POOL. MICHAEL 18 28 35 41 
POOLE, COON E 16 13 9 3 
PULVER,KERRY 9 24 26 
QUINN, HEATHER E 
REDSHAW. JAMES D 160 230 139 120 
REEDY, DAVID P 43 28 20 20 
ROAN, PETER G 7 2 3 5 
ROSENQUIST, JANET 3 2 1 11 
ROSER, LOUIS A 2 
RUDD. WS 112 60 69 17 
RYAN, MICHAELJ 
SAWYER, TIMOTHY E 55 47 34 17 
SCALES, LISA M 1 3 3 
SCANLAN. KATHLEEN M 9 4 4 1 
SCHEFFEL, SCOT B 7 3 5 
SCHUL THEISS, KARL 11 74 70 
SCHWARZ, MATTHEW B 22 16 13 6 
SCHWEIGER. GREGORY P 43 44 33 35 
SEABOURN, JEFFREY T 1 2 
SEALE, WALTER l 1 
SELL, MATTHEW S 2 1 3 
SHEARER DEPP, ALISON 3 3 5 
SIMON. TAMARA 2 
SMITH, OOUGLAS E 114 141 131 85 
SPENCER, STEPHEN E 42 58 28 37 
STEMMLER. BERTRAM 1 
STOUNE, JOHN L 1 2 5 1 
STOWELl, ERIK D 21 21 63 9 
SWANSON, JOEL C 1 1 
SWEETEN, NEIL H 
SYED. MOHSIN M 
THOMPSON, SANDRA 11 9 
TOBE, CHRISTOPHER R 49 56 41 26 
VERSKA. JOSEPH 55 17 5 19 
WADE. GEORGE A 6 2 
WALKER. ROBERT N 165 143 134 32 
WALSH, GUERIN M 1 1 1 
WATERS, STANLEY J 72 30 35 30 
WILSON. RICHARD W 23 25 36 14 
ZIMMERMAN, CHRISTIAN 149 173 91 35 
TOTALS 4,844 4747 4068 3083 
% ot TOTAL COMBINED MRICIIMI 62.8% 57.4% 47.9% 39.6% 
MRIC 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Mar-l1 Total 
20 6 1 207 
2 1 26 
49 88 
22 141 
4 1 16 
24 146 
1 42 
15 1 1 77 
1 1 
84 14 6 1 734 
7 1 119 
1 18 
9 - 26 
2 
258 
1 1 
2 1 1 158 
-
7 
3 - 21 
2 1 19 
41 1 198 
13 2 72 
9 1 165 
3 
1 
1 7 
1 12 
4 6 
84 14 8 4 4 585 
12 3 180 
1 
2 - 2 1 2 16 
114 
-
2 
-
1 1 
- 1 1 
31 6 1 3 1 58 
24 196 
4 100 
3 11 
13 3 1 493 
3 
31 17 22 3 1 253 
21 4 1 127 
14 7 474 
2083 628 284 79 26 30 8 20297 
31.2% 8,9% 3.6% 1.2% 04% 0.5% 0.8% 
RIVER. MARY E 227 173 147 115 74 21 13 765 
% ot TOTAL COMBINED MRICIIMI 93.8% 71.8% 57,2% 57.2% 26,0% 10.0% 5,2% 0,0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
GIBSON. SAMUEL S 6 17 22 18 7 70 
% ofTOTAL COMBINED MRICIIMI 100.0% 81.0% 81.5% 100,0% 21.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0,0% 0,0% 0.0% 
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IMI 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Mar-ll Tolal 
2 17 79 93 75 83 71 60 47 55 6 588 
11 60 130 131 153 193 81 30 65 77 8 959 
1 60 51 84 48 48 14 288 
2 2 9 7 10 25 15 15 21 17 2 125 
1 2 3 3 1 10 
6 50 62 50 33 8 209 
32 11 5 3 9 9 9 7 49 28 3 165 
1 8 27 28 39 59 40 72 87 20 379 
7 12 8 8 35 
34 35 57 74 140 188 200 215 246 230 42 1.439 
86 77 98 93 84 84 52 43 39 8 616 
2 1 3 
1 7 21 26 1 88 
1 10 41 46 3 101 
3 28 61 15 107 
1 1 2 4 
6 32 79 139 152 151 240 249 191 188 38 1.465 
1 1 1 1 4 
13 11 2 5 5 10 1 6 5 12 1 71 
30 51 40 38 84 52 105 120 115 137 22 784 
3 14 67 90 117 84 140 82 14 611 
51 46 35 40 30 58 14 23 38 14 6 353 
1 1 18 30 28 46 33 30 2 189 
1 1 2 4 
1 1 
5 1 6 4 1 1 18 
1 1 1 1 5 1 10 
6 2 1 9 
88 108 113 112 163 248 228 207 211 235 14 1,725 
1 1 3 2 12 11 24 23 19 13 2 111 
1 1 2 
2 1 1 1 5 
5 4 7 14 30 
5 22 38 84 49 7 175 
15 48 40 60 36 71 5 275 
7 7 
8 55 57 74 158 74 65 51 2 542 
1 65 5 9 5 44 52 58 55 74 9 378 
58 308 284 229 3 15 14 3 4 2 2 902 
39 33 33 51 30 51 106 62 81 89 14 589 
25 86 155 85 24 36 23 63 86 80 28 651 
3 1 4 
1 3 3 35 18 41 111 88 25 36 13 372 
22 18 23 18 84 43 36 76 84 46 5 424 
242 184 181 201 169 149 141 151 142 120 7 1,687 
2669 3522 4,418 4707 4601 6389 6840 6461 6389 6,336 1053 53585 
37.2% 42.5% 52.1% 804% 68.8% 91.1% 96.4% 98.8% 99.6% 99,5% 99,2% 
15 86 110 88 211 190 237 435 333 341 53 2,079 
6,2% 28,2% 42.8% 42.8% 74.0% 90.0% 94.8% 100.0% 100,0% 100,0% 100.0% 
4 5 28 30 27 27 32 29 5 185 
0,0% 19.0% 18,5% 0.0% 78,8% 100.0% 100,0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
42% 
IMI Exams at the Downtown Location 
Exams by Physicians 
Included in Damages: 
Pre-9/99 
Relationships 
17,760 Exams 
~9% 
Exams by Physicians Included in Damages: Other 
SARMC Affiliates 
4,100 Exams 
49% 
DEFENDANT 
XBlBITSOOO 
CV OC 2004-008219 
Physicians Referring to IMI at the Downtown, Meridian and Eagle Locations 
Physicians Included in Damages: Pre-9/99 
Relationships ~. 
67 ~ 
Physicians Included in Damages: Other 
SARMC Affiliates 
193 
DEFENDANT 
EXHIBIT 5003 
CV OC 2004-008219 
Who's Who 
• st. Alphonsus 
SARMC: Saint Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center 
SADC: Saint Alphonsus 
Diversified Care 
• MRIA: MRI Associates 
- MRICI: MRI Center of Idaho 
- MRIM: MRI Mobile 
• Radiologists 
- SARG: Saint Alphonsus 
Radiology Group 
- GSR: Gem State Radiology 
- ICR: Imaging Center 
- BR: Boise Radiology 
• Imaging Centers 
MRICI: MRI Center of Idaho 
- MRIM: MRI Mobile 
IMI: Intermountain Medical 
Imaging 
DEFENDANT 
EXHIBIT 5038 
CV oc 2004-008219 
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Results 
(Professional 
Component) 
Sends Patient 
to Imaging 
Center 
MRI SCANNER 
(MRI CENTER) 
~ 
Images Patient 
(Technical Component) 
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INSTRUCTION NO.5 
The following facts are not in dispute: 
St. Alphonsus and MRIA were partners and entered into a partnerhship agreement 
in 1985. 
St. Alphonsus disassociated from the partnership in April 2004. The mere act of 
dissociation from a partenership is not a violation of Idaho law. Whether other actions of 
Saint Alphonsus's may have violated the law or legal obligations to the other parties to the 
partnership, as is alleged by the plaintiffs. is for you to determine. 
003194 
INSTRUCTION NO. 37 
Saint Alphonsus dissociated from the MRIA partnership on April 1, 2004 pursuant to 
its right to do so under Idaho law. 
Under the terms of the MIRA partnership, Saint Alphonsus could not compete 
against the businesses run by MRIA until one year after it dissociated, that is April 1 ,2005. 
You may not award damages to MRIA, MRI Center, or MRI Mobile based upon 
Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from the MRIA partnership-something Saint Alphonsus 
had the right to do. Furthermore, you may not award damages to MRIA, MRI Center, or 
MRI Mobile simply because Saint Alphonsus competed with these businesses after April 1, 
2005, which it had the right to do. 
If, however, you find that Saint Alphonsus began to compete by its actions 
with MRIA, MRI Center, or MRI Mobile prior to April 1, 2005, or otherwise caused 
economic damages to the MRI entities by its actions prior to April 1, 2004, you may then 
award damages to MRIA. MRI Center, and MRI Mobile for any injury caused by Saint 
Alphonsus's conduct prior to 2005, even if the damages caused by those actions occurred 
after 2005. However, if you find damages should be awarded, you may only award 
damages which you find were incurred prior to December 31, 2015. 
003228 
INSTRUCTION NO. 50 
A partner may adhere to the strict legal requirements of a written agreement, 
in this case the MRI partnership agreement, and still be held responsible for violating a 
fiduciary obligation to its partners if the action taken was improperly motivated, such as 
taking advantage of its partnership position to obtain financial gain. It is for you, the jury, to 
determine whether an alleged action has taken place and, if it is otherwise in compliance 
with the terms of the MRIA partnership agreement between the parties, whether the action 
was improperly motivated. 
003242 
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OCT 31 2011 
CHRISTOPH5f1 O. I1ICH c_ 
ay ovwe OATMAN ' 
~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MRI ASSOCIATES, INC., an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited liability ) 
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, ) 
an Idaho limited liability partnership, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219 
) 
vs. ) SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
) 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED ) 
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, ) 
and SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL ) 
MEDICAL CENTER, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
-----------------------------) 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
As to the MRIA entities' claims that Saint Alphonsus breached the 
Partnership Agreement by breach of the non-compete clause?: 
Question No.1: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus has breached the Partnership 
Agreement by breaching the non-compete clause, as set forth in Instruction No. 39? 
Answer to Question No.1: Yes LLJ No L-.J 
Question No.2: If you answered "yes" to Question 1, do you find that Saint Alphonsus 
proved either its defense of Estoppel, as described in Instruction 42, or Waiver, as ~ SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 1 003168 
described in Instruction 43, as to the breach of the partnership agreement? If you 
answered "no" to Question 1, leave your answer to this question blank. 
Answer to Question No.2: Yes~ NoW 
As to the MRIA entities' claims that Saint Alphonsus breached the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing: 
Question No.3: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus has breached the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing as set forth in Instructions Nos. 40 and 41? 
Answer to Question No 3. Yes LLJ No ~ 
Question No.4: If you answered "yes" to Question 3, do you find that Saint Alphonsus 
proved either its defense of Estoppel, as described in Instruction 42, or Waiver, as 
described in Instruction 43, as to breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing? 
If you answered "no" to Question 3, leave your answer to this question blank. 
Answer to Question No.4: Yes ~ No LL.J 
As to MRI Center's and MRI Mobile's claims that Saint Alphonsus 
intentionally interfered with MRI Center's, or MRI Mobile's prospective contractual 
relations or business expectations: 
Question No.5: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus intentionally interfered with MRI 
entities' prospective economic relations or business expectations, as described in 
Instruction No. 44? 
Answer to Question No.5: Yes [ /1 No L--.J 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 2 003169 
Question No.6: If you answered "yes" to Question 5, do you find that Saint Alphonsus 
proved either its defense of estoppel, as described in Instruction 42, or waiver, as 
described in Instruction 43, as to interference with prospective contractual relations? If 
you answered "no" to Question 5, leave your answer to this question blank. 
Answer to Question No.6: Yes~ NOL.\LJ 
As to the MRI entities' claims that Saint Alphonsus breached a fiduciary 
duty owed to the MRI entities: 
Question No.7: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus breached a fiduciary duty owed to 
MRIA, MRI Center or MRI Mobile, as described in Instructions Nos. 45, 46, 47, 48, 49 
and 50? 
Answer to Question No.7: Yes [ /1 No '-----' 
Question No.8: If you answered "yes" to question no. 7, do you find that Saint 
Alphonsus misappropriated a partnership opportunity as described in Instruction No. 
47? You must decide separately as to the two misappropriations alleged in this case: 
(A) the opportunity for MRIA to partner with GSR in 1M!, and (8) MRI Mobile's 
opportunity to open a facility in Meridian, Idaho 
Answers to Question No.8 
For the opportunity to partner with radiologists in imaging centers: Yes LY6 NoL-J 
For the Meridian opportunity: Yes W No ~ 
Question No.9: If you answered "yes" to Question 7, do you find that Saint Alphonsus 
proved either its defense of estoppel, as described in Instruction 42, or waiver, as 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 3 003170 
described in Instruction 43, as to breach of fiduciary duty? If you answered "no" to 
Question 7, leave your answer to this question blank. 
Answer to Question No.9: Yes L-J No L1LJ 
As to MRI entities' claims that Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil 
conspiracy: 
Question No. 10: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil conspiracy, as 
described in Instruction No 51? 
Answer to Question No.1 0 yesLiJ No L.--J 
Question No. 11: If you answered "yes" to Question 10, do you find that Saint 
Aiphonsus proved either its defense of estoppel, as described in Instruction 42, or 
waiver, as described in Instruction 43, as to civil conspiracy? If you answered "no" to 
Question 10, leave your answer to this question blank. 
Answer to Question No.11: Yes L-J No L0 
If you left blank or answered "yes" to Questions 2, 4, 6, 9, and 11, then sign 
the special verdict form and present it to the Bailiff. If you answered "no" to any 
of Questions 2, 4, 6, 9, or 11, then continue to Question No. 12 below. 
As to Damages: 
Question No. 12: If you answered "yes" to Question 1, and "no" to Question 2, what 
amount of net profits, if any, did each of the MRI entities lose as a result of the breach of 
the partnership agreement? If you answered "no" to Question 1, or "yes" to Question 2, 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 4 003171 
or if the MRI entities have not adequately proven any amount of lost profits leave the 
answers to this question blank. 
Answer to Question No. 12: 
MRI Center: $ 'L-=f/iZZ, '388' 
MRI Mobile: $ Z LI J '" Z/'2r 
You must now determine MRIA's share of those damages, and adjust the 
amounts of damages to MRI Center and MRI Mobile 
A. Total the damages for MRI Center and MRI Mobile 52) 034 ,SIS"' 
.. 
B. Multiply the result in A by 0.075 3) Cf()it:J1s'SZ 
C. Multiply MRI Center's damages by 0.925 25,'8 28 i 'Zl)8 
. 
D. Multiply MRI Mobile's damages by 0.925 z 2, 3(ft1/i6"f-
r ' 
You must now enter the amounts you calculated above as your final answer to 
this question 
MRI Associates (answer to B above): 
MRI Center (answer to C above): 
MRI Mobile (answer to D above): 
$_--:3'-J-J _'1_0-.:::..0+/ ",--:S.=-3 .=..8 __ 
$---=2=-5-+-1 """O-!::Z:::..!:84/~200:..::()::-!Z=--_ 
$_Z_Z--s.I_S_4'1--..:.....r-J _9=-0 t.!..--_ 
Question No. 13: If you answered "yes" to Question 1, and "no" to Question 2, what 
amount of value, if any, did MRI Center lose as a result of the breach of the partnership 
agreement? If you answered "no" to Question 1, or "yes" to Question 2, or if MRI 
Center has not adequately proven any amount of lost value leave the answer to this 
question blank. 
Answer to Question No. 13: 
MRI Center: 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 5 003172 
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Question No. 14: If you answered "yes" to Question 3, and "no" to Question 4, what 
amount of net profits, if any, did each of the MRI entities lose as a result of the breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing? If you answered "no" to Question 3, or 
"yes" to Question 4, or if the MRI entities have not adequately proven any amount of lost 
profits leave the answers to this question blank. 
Answer to Question No. 14: 
MRI Center: $_ ..... Z_.J...<--+-} _<1:......;2,_2-+-) ..=3,-",Zo<...;;8=-.. 
M RI Mobile: $~Z"""---Jlj4/--t1~0:....:::Z=-).,......./L..::Z:::-l.L-_ 
You must now determine MRIA's share of those damages, and adjust the 
amounts of damages to MRI Center and MRI Mobile 
A. Total the damages for MRI Center and MRI Mobile 52j (/1/1, ~/.5 
Y • 
B. Multiply the result in A by 0.075 
C. Multiply MRI Center's damages by 0.925 
3,Q""1 $58 
Z 5') 828, z(J8 
D. Multiply MRI Mobile's damages by 0,925 z 2..) 3i.{CJ,'1h'1-
r I 
You must now enter the amounts you calculated above as your final answer to 
this question 
MRI Associates (answer to B above): $_'3-,-+I---,-Q-,,--6 ",-+" 1-=-5.=,.,,5 8=--_ I I 
MRI Center (answer to C above): $_2_5+1 -=~,---z._Z_If-l =-zo---c8=--_ 
MRI Mobile (answer to D above): $---=Z:;;.......2--1-)---='3"-4-"'-~/+-, '1...:...::lf#""--<r<---_ 
Question No. 15: If you answered "yes" to Question 3, and "no" to Question 4, what 
amount of value, if any, did MRI Center lose as a result of the breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing? If you answered "no" to Question 3, or "yes" to Question 4, 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 6 003173 
• I 
or if MRI Center has not adequately proven any amount of lost value leave the answer 
to this question blank. 
Answer to Question No. 15: 
MRI Center: $_2_~-L-J l1--!..-2.._0-l-) _tJt)_() _ 
Question No. 16: If you answered "yes" to Question 5, and "no" to Question 6, what 
amount of net profits, if any, did MRI Center or MRI Mobile lose as a result of the 
intentional interference with prospective contractual relations? If you answered "no" to 
Question 5, or "yes" to Question 6, or if the MRI Center and MRI Mobile have not 
adequately proven any amount of lost profits leave the answers to this question blank. 
Answer to Question No. 16: 
MRI Center: 
MRI Mobile: $ z tj J I 02 J 12 r 
, J-
Question No. 17: If you answered "yes" to Question 5, and "no" to Question 6, what 
amount of value, if any did MRI Center lose as a result of the intentional interference 
with prospective contractual relations? If you answered "no" to Question 5, or "yes" to 
Question 6, or if the MRI Center has not adequately proven any amount of lost value 
leave the answer to this question blank. 
Answer to Question No. 17: 
MRI Center: 
Question No. 18: If you assigned damages in Question 16 or 17, what percentage of 
the damages is attributable to Saint Alphonsus, and what percentage is attributable to 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 7 
003174 
Gem State Radiology, Intermountain Medical Imaging, and Imaging Center 
Radiologists? Your answers together must equal one hundred percent (100%) 
Answer to Question No. 18: 
Saint Alphonsus 
GSR, IMI, and ICR 
90 % 
10 % 
Question No. 19: If you assigned damages in Question 16, applying the percentage 
from Question 18, what is the total dollar amount of lost net profits attributable to Saint 
Alphonsus? 
Answer to Question No. 19: 
MRI Center: 
MRI Mobile: 
Question No. 20: If you assigned damages in Question 17, applying the percentage 
from Question 18, what is the total dollar amount of lost business value attributable to 
Saint Alphonsus? 
Answer to Question No. 20: 
MRI Center: 
Question No. 21: If you answered "yes" to Question 7 and/or answered "yes" to 
Question 8 as to the Meridian opportunity. and "no" to Question 9, what amount of net 
profits, if any did each of the MRI entities lose as a result of the breach of fiduciary 
duty? If you answered "no" to Question 7, or "yes" to Question 9, or if the MRI entities 
have not adequately proven any amount of lost profits leave the answers to this 
question blank. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 8 
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, . 
Answer to Question No. 21: 
MRI Center: $_2.=;.....:.=t--+t --,-q-=:Z:;..""Z~J,-",,3~Z...w8~_ 
J I 
MRI Mobile: $_...::2=-'1..!.fI-:..J-'!:.b---=Z,-+-, _'_2_1-__ 
I I 
You must now determine MRIA's share of those damages, and adjust the 
amounts of damages to MRI Center and MRI Mobile 
A. Total the damages for MRI Center and MRI Mobile 50084/S/S 
B. Multiply the result in A by 0.075 3) q DIa) 3'58 
C. Multiply MRI Center's damages by 0.925 ~ 8Z"gj ZOO 
D. Multiply MRI Mobile's damages by 0.925 Z2J 3<f1) 9ht-
You must now enter the amounts you calculated above as your final answer to 
this question 
MRI Associates (answer to B above): 
MRI Center (answer to C above): 
MRI Mobile (answer to D above): 
Question No. 22: If you answered "yes" to Question 7, and "no" to Question 9, what 
amount of value, if any, did MRI Center lose as a result of the breach of fiduciary duty? 
If you answered "no" to Question 7, or "yes" to Question 9, or if MRI Center has not 
adequately proven any amount of lost value leave the answer to this question blank. 
Answer to Question No. 22: 
MRI Center: 
Question No. 23: If you assigned damages in Question 21 or 22, what percentage of 
the damages is attributable to Saint Alphonsus, and what percentage is attributable to 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 9 003176 
Gem State Radiology, Intermountain Medical Imaging, and Imaging Center 
Radiologists? Your answers together must equal one hundred percent (100%) 
Answer to Question No. 23: 
Saint Alphonsus 
GSR, IMI, and ICR 
_",-=-,0_0 _% 
D % 
---"---
Question No. 24: If you assigned damages in Question 21, applying the percentage 
from Question 23, what is the total dollar amount of net lost profits attributable to Saint 
Alphonsus? 
Answer to Question No. 24: 
MRI Center: 
MRI Mobile: 
MRI Associates 
$ ___ 2_S~)~~~Z~g,~J~2~D~g~ 
$ __ 2~2-+) -""lL-4.L..-CfY-J ----'~:...x&'-'-=t_ 
$_------"3-+1 -1-1 ....... 0""""""(,,+-1 ..=.-;;-=-5 ........ 0_ 
Question No. 25: If you assigned damages in Question 22, applying the percentage 
from Question 23, what is the total dollar amount of lost business value attributable to 
Saint Alphonsus? 
Answer to Question No. 25: 
MRI Center: 
Question No. 26: If you answered "yes" to Question 10, and "no" to Question 11, what 
amount of net profits did each of the MRI entities lose as a result of the civil conspiracy? 
If you answered "no" to Question 10, or "yes" to Question 11, or if the MRI entities have 
not adequately proven any amount of lost profits leave the answers to this question 
blank. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 10 
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Answer to Question No. 26: 
You must now determine MRIA's share of those damages, and adjust the 
amounts of damages to MRI Center and MRI Mobile 
A. Total the damages for MRI Center and MRI Mobile 
B. Multiply the result in A by 0.075 
C. Multiply MRI Center's damages by 0.925 
52" D'8Lf,57S 
3, 9t2fa j :ssg 
z.s-, gZZI Z~8 
r I 
D. Multiply MRI Mobile's damages by 0.925 Z Z I 3'1GJ I 167-
r I 
You must now enter the amounts you calculated above as your final answer to 
this question 
MRI Associates (answer to B above): 
MRI Center (answer to C above): 
MRI Mobile (answer to D above): 
$_~_11-<1:...JEO~t,'::....J-J-=~:.....5~8,---_ 
$---....::Z"""'s..=-;-,'--'Z......,ZZ==-t-J --"2..,,..0,-,-,8,--_ 
$_Z.=2=-jJ~3",,-lf1I---1-+/ --=.q""":'&'...I.-I __ 
Question No. 27: If you answered "yes" to Question 10, and "no" to Question 11, what 
amount of value did MRI Center lose as a result of the civil conspiracy? If you 
answered "no" to Question 7, or "yes" to Question 9, or if MRI Center has not 
adequately proven any amount of lost value leave the answer to this question blank. 
Answer to Question No. 27: 
MRI Center: 
Question No. 28: If you assigned damages in Question 26 or 27, what percentage of 
the damages is attributable to Saint Alphonsus, and what percentage is attributable to 
Gem State Radiology, Intermountain Medical Imaging, and Imaging Center 
Radiologists? Your answers together must equal one hundred percent (100%) 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 11 003178 
· . 
Answer to Question No. 28: 
Saint Alphonsus 30 % 
---"'---'----
GSR, 1M!, and ICR __ Z6~,,--_% 
Question No. 29: If you assigned damages in Question 26, applying the percentage 
from Question 28, what is the total dollar amount of net lost profits attributable to Saint 
Alphonsus? 
Answer to Question No. 29: 
MRI Center: $ z-O J fcC,2j S;-0~ 
MRI Mobile: $ 17- J 819, 9r.s 
MRI Associates $ '2) 12 5, (51-D 
Question No. 30: If you assigned damages in Question 27, applying the percentage 
from Question 28, what is the total dollar amount of lost business value attributable to 
Saint Alphonsus? 
Answer to Question No. 30: 
MRI Center: 
Question 31: Which of Questions 12,13,14,15,19,20,24,25,29, and 30 resulted in 
the largest total dollar amount? 
Answer to Question No. 31: 
12-
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 12 003179 
Question No. 32: If you answered "yes" to Question 8 and "no" to Question 9, what is 
the total amount of net profits Saint Alphonsus realized as a result of misappropriating a 
partnership opportunity or opportunities? 
Answer to Question No. 32: 
Opportunity to partner with radiologists in imaging centers 
Meridian opportunity 
$ \9, at, l)to r:t 
DATED this 3 J day of {),,;+otxU'" , 2.DJI . 
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